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I
INTRODUCTION

Judicial resolution of economic contract disputes in the People's Republic
of China ("PRC") has become an increasingly common phenomenon., This
growth in litigation mandates new attention to the role of courts in the
resolution of commercial disputes in Chinese society. A paucity of
information on the function and workings of Chinese courts presently exists;
in recent years, foreign scholars of Chinese law have devoted most of their
energies to exegesis of new legislation rather than analysis of the institutions,
processes, and individual actors that constitute the emerging Chinese legal
system.
The adjudication 2 process itself deserves study. Little is known, for
example, about the working relationships among various levels of courts, the
supervisory role played by the Supreme People's Court, the coordination of
the courts with the procuracy, or the interaction of disputants, judges, and
lawyers during a case. And although research into procedural practice-not
simply procedural rules-can be of only limited scope for foreign researchers
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1. In 1986, 320,000 economic disputes were accepted by Chinese courts, up 42% from the
1985 figure. Economic contract disputes accounted for over 90% of all economic disputes. See
Zheng, Work Report of the Supreme People's Court, BULLETIN OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, No. 2
(1987).
2. "Adjudication" is used here in a broad sense. Strictly speaking, adjudication is the judicial
determination of a controversy and the rendering of a judgment. For our purposes, however,
adjudication encompasses not only court decisionmaking that results in a judgment, but also court
action that leads to a settlement between parties. As a reading of any of the collections of civil cases
that have appeared in the last several years shows, the great majority of civil disputes brought before
Chinese courts are eventually settled through court mediation.
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at this time, the procedural aspects of litigation certainly warrant
examination.3
Central to an understanding of the adjudication process is the issue of
what norms courts apply when deciding or mediating disputes. The
prototypical model of courts assumes that judges apply pre-existing legal
rules in arriving at their decisions. 4 Specifically, these legal rules are laws,
administrative regulations, and, in common law courts, case law. However, at
least in the field of economic contracts, Chinese courts have tried and decided
conflicts without reference to laws and regulations, thereby suggesting that
other norms or guidelines may shape judicial decisionmaking. 5 This paper
attempts to determine what norms and other factors, legal or non-legal, have
guided courts in one particular type of economic contract dispute: rural
production responsibility contract (nongcun chengbao hetong) disputes. First
for over 10
accepted by courts in 1982, by 1985 such disputes accounted
6
percent of economic disputes tried by Chinese courts.
Part I of the article introduces rural responsibility contracts, summarizes
the policy and law framework surrounding them, and describes the causes of
responsibility contract disputes. In addition, it reviews the courts' gradual
recognition of the contracts as legally enforceable agreements and notes how
administrative resolution of disputes is far more common than adjudication.
Part II analyzes the norms and guidelines that have influenced court
resolution-whether through mediation or the rendering of a judgment-of
the disputes.

3. Analyses of civil procedure issues based on actual cases have begun to appear in China. See,
e.g., ZHOU ET AL., ANALYSIS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE STUDIES (1988). Though many Chinese lawyers
privately acknowledge that courts often do not adhere strictly to procedural rules, it is also evident
that higher courts have overturned lower court decisions for procedural violations; future studies will
need to determine what type of procedural violations are considered serious enough to warrant
annulment of a decision.
4.

See generally M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).

Shapiro

uses a comparative law analysis to argue that there are few, if any, courts in the world that fit the
standard prototype which assumes courts are characterized by four features: (1) an independent
judge (2) who applies pre-existing legal norms (3) in adversarial proceedings and (4) renders a
'winner-take-all" decision in which one party is adjudged to be clearly wrong and the other right.
5. See, e.g., the economic contract cases analyzed in Macneil, Contract in China: Law, Practice, and
Dispute Resolution, 38 STAN. L. REV. 303 (1986); these cases were decided by courts before the
Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China ("the Economic Contract Law") took
effect in July 1982. Macneil lists five "sources of law" that guided court resolution of the disputes:
the contractual relationship itself, general contract principles, administrative regulations, custom and
course of dealing, and ideology and the public interest. See id. at 334-348. Only one-fourth of the
cases cited administrative regulations; the majority of the cases did not refer, at least explicitly, to
promulgated legal rules. Macneil's focus, however, is not on these sources of law but on certain
broader "contract norms" which, he says, underlie Chinese contractual relations. See id. at 338-389.
6. According to knowledgeable sources, the number of responsibility contract disputes grew
steadily between 1982 and 1985, but declined after 1985 as collectives and peasants gained
experience in drafting contracts and setting appropriate contract fees. In addition, in some localities
where incomes from sideline production of products such as fruit or vegetables were very high,
collectives re-adopted cooperative arrangements.
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II
RURAL PRODUCTION RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

A.

Rural Responsibility Contracts: A Background
Rural production responsibility contracts are the product of the rural

decollectivization reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978-79. The reform,
the success of which enabled the Chinese leader to launch other ambitious
reforms of the economy, sought to spur agricultural production by
introducing "production-linked contract responsibility systems" (lianchan
chengbao zerenzhi), which decentralized control over production and linked
compensation of an individual to his or her productivity. Numerous variants
of production responsibility systems were introduced by rural cadres during
7
the initial years of the reform.
By late 1983, however, one type had become standard throughout the

country: "full responsibility contracting to the household" (baogan dao hu).
Under the system of full responsibility contracting to the household,
commonly called the household responsibility system, peasant households
contract with their collectives to assume full responsibility for the
management of a parcel of the collective's land. The collective's role in
production is reduced to technical assistance and sale or supply of seed,
fertilizer, and other production inputs to households. In return for the right

to farm the collective's land, households agree to sell a specified amount of
grain or other products subject to contract procurement obligations8 to state
purchasing organs, to pay the state agricultural tax, and to pay to the
collective certain collective "dues" or fees-contributions to the collective's

public welfare fund, public capital accumulation fund, and sometimes a
"management fee" (guanli fei), covering miscellaneous

collective expenses

such as subsidies for local level cadres and office supplies.

Once these

7. For a summary of the various types of contracts, see Kueh, The Economics of the "Second Land
Reform" in China, CHINA Q 122 (No. 101, 1985).
8. The former compulsory procurement system under which rural collectives were required to
sell to the state quotas of the four major farm products-grain, cotton, velvet, and vegetable oil
crops-and quotas of other agricultural products (so-called "sideline production"), as well as surplus
production, was abolished in 1985 and replaced by a contract procurement system (hetong dinggouzhi).
In theory, under the contract system, which is meant to bring market forces into play in agricultural
production, individual producers or collectives voluntarily contract with the state (through state
purchasing units at local levels) to sell grain and staple crops to the state; surpluses may be sold on
the free market. In fact, the former compulsory quotas have been largely preserved, for there is little
or no bargaining between individual producers and the state. Typically, production quotas assigned
to a province are broken down at successively lower administrative levels until the individual
producer is assigned a production obligation. The break-downs are made on the basis of past
production history with possible adjustment for any anticipated declines or increases. Purchase
contracts usually are signed by village level administrative units rather than by producer households.
Thus, households must meet what are essentially mandatory administrative quotas for grain and
certain other agricultural products which remain subject to the state plan. In the case of sideline
products, such as fruits, vegetables, and tea, decontrol has proceeded further. Farmers do not have
to sign purchase contracts with state purchasing departments at all, but may sell to other commercial
organizations at free market prices.
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obligations are met, households are allowed to keep any surplus production;
in most households, a portion of the surplus is stocked for personal
consumption or feed use, and the rest sold on the open market or to the state
at higher, above quota prices.
Full responsibility contracting has not been limited to grain and staple
crop land. Specialized production resources of collectives such as fruit
orchards, fish ponds, animal breeding facilities, and brick kilrs and other
manufacturing or processing operations have also been contracted out to
households. Contracts for the management of these types of resources are
sometimes referred to as "specialized contracts," (zhuanye chengbao hetong).
They stand in contrast to general or "comprehensive" land contracts
(zonghexing tudi chengbao hetong), the ubiquitous 9 contracts between collectives
and households for the management of collectives' grain and staple crop land
under which the household plants and harvests a number of different crops in
accordance with the state procurement quotas their collective must meet.
Households signing specialized contracts are termed "specialized
households" (zhuanyehu).' 0
Under specialized contracts, households' obligations to the collective are
simpler than in general land contracts: Households usually need pay the
collective only a cash "contract fee" (chengbao fei).' l Households thus can
retain all of their production. Some specialized contracts for larger-scale
operations-such as contracts for the management of collective-owned
factories-do require the contracting party to reach a target production
figure; a penalty is imposed for failing to meet the target, or, if the target is
exceeded, the contracting party and collective divide profits from the surplus
production according to a stipulated ratio.
Many, but not all, rural responsibility contracts are in written form. Early
Party documents sanctioning the use of output responsibility systems did not
call on teams to sign contracts with peasants,' 2 but written contracts
nonetheless appeared shortly after the introduction of responsibility systems,
apparently to alleviate peasants' fears that their newly granted production
autonomy would be stripped away should "policy change." 1 3 No single
9. With the possible exception of a small number of households which in recent years have
"left the land," all households in a village will hold a comprehensive land contract. By contrast, only
a handful of households will be party to a specialized contract; specialized resources are not
distributed through an egalitarian formula, as is collective land, but contracted out through either an
open bidding process or the selection of appropriate contracting households (or groups or
individuals) by collective leaders.
10. "Specialized households" refer to rural households which devote most of their labor to the
specialized production of a product or management of an operation and which sell rather than
consume most of their output. Households that undertake specialized responsibility contracts are
one type of specialized household; the other is the household that independently sets up shop. See
Du, THE REFORM OF CHINA'S RURAL ECONOMY 25 n.9 (1985).
11. Occasionally, the contract fee will be a payment in kind. Some contracts require payment of
a cash fee plus sale at a preferential rate or donation to the collective of a certain amount of the
specialized product for personal consumption by collective families.
12. These documents are listed in notes 21 and 22 infra; see also text accompanying notes 21-26.

13.

See

QIAN, INFORMATION

ON RURUAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS

8 (1986). See also Chen &

Zhong, Promote the Contract System to Carn Out the Production Responsibility System, in 5

RURAL WORK
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standardized format for contracts, either land or specialized, has been
developed. Rather, depending on the level of sophistication of local
agricultural cadres and peasants and on available resources, contracts range
in form from very simple to detailed, with specialized contracts usually more
complex than general land contracts. For general land contracts, some
degree of standardization has occurred as many township governments or
counties have printed and issued contract forms that are used by all local
villages." 4 In contrast, specialized contracts are usually drafted by village
cadres who often use one format for all contracts pertaining to a given type of
resource. Thus, within a village, contracts for apple orchards may differ in
form and substance from contracts for small-scale processing factories in the
village, but all the orchard contracts are likely to be very similar in both form
and content.
Even as notarization of contracts is gaining in popularity,' 5 oral contracts
are still frequently encountered. As discussed below, courts may decide to
enforce an oral contract. Notarization (gongzheng), which should not be
confused with certification (jianzheng), or the official authorization to enter
into a contract that is granted by an organ with supervisory authority over the
unit signing the contract, is optional and ordinarily used for specialized
contracts involving major undertakings. For example, contracts for the
management of township factories commonly employ notarization. Generally
requested by the party assuming management responsibility as a safeguard
against contract disputes, notarization does not guarantee that the contract
will be upheld in court; but courts are more willing to uphold and strictly
6
enforce the terms of notarized contracts than unnotarized ones.'
B.

Causes of Responsibility Contract Disputes

Most of the responsibility contract disputes reported in the press and law
journals and discussed in this article have arisen over specialized contracts
BULLETIN

24 (1981), and Zheng, Conscientiously Sign and Perform Responsibility Contracts, 3

BULLETIN

24 (1982).

RURAL WORK

14. In some areas, written general land contracts have evolved from crude documents, to
elaborate booklets that incorporate a wealth of administrative detail, back to simple one- or two-page
agreements.
15. Rural officials interviewed were unable to provide any statistics on the percentage of
specialized contracts that have been notarized. They reported, however, that the notary public's
services were increasingly in demand and that notarization of contracts was not regarded as unusual.
The role of the Chinese notary public is similar to the function of notaries in Continental law systems
and extends beyond the simple duties of the American notary. For example, Chinese notary officials
will review contracts for completeness, clarity, and legality. They will also check the credentials of
parties to the contract to verify that they have the legal authority to enter into the contract. For a
review of the re-emerging functions of Chinese notaries, see Chen, The Chinese Votariat: An Overlooked
Cornerstone of the Legal System of the People's Republic of China, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 63 (1986).
16. Zweig et al. state that notarization is essential for any claimant in a dispute who seeks to
establish the binding force of a contract. See Zweig et al., Law, Contracts, and Economic Modernization:
Lessons from the Recent Chinese Rural Reforms, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 319, 329 (1987); but both judicial
officials and agricultural officials interviewed by the author asserted that notarization, while desirable
and generally encouraged, was not essential for a contract to have binding force. Judges stated that
notarization would, however, help convince the court that the contract had been formed legitimately
and was legal.
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rather than general land contracts. Land contracts have rarely led to disputes
for several reasons. First, barring natural disasters, households have not
experienced difficulties in fulfilling their production obligations. These
production quotas usually claim only a portion of the total harvest they have
been reaping from their contracted land. Second, low prices of grain and the
egalitarian distribution of contract land generate limited profits, thereby
minimizing

feelings

of envy

or inequality among

households.

Third,

arguments over contract interpretation are very rare because contracts are
highly standardized and in recent years increasingly simple. Finally, and most
fundamentally, peasants appear to regard general land contracts as essentially

the formalization of administrative decisions made by village or team leaders
rather than legal pacts creating legally enforceable rights and duties. This
view of the contracts renders peasants willing to accept leaders' proposals to
modify contracts, especially if the proposed changes would affect all
households similarly. This view explains why extremely few land contract
disputes are brought before courts.
In contrast, disputes over specialized contracts have not been uncommon
and have been appearing in courts regularly since the early 1980's. Unlike
general land contracts, many specialized contracts offer the potential for large
profits: Prices for specialized agricultural products such as fruit and fish have

sharply increased after being decontrolled, while contract fees have been
modest, largely because collectives have tended to underestimate the
profitability of specialized resources. As the contracts negotiated in the early
and mid-1980's expire, collectives will certainly drive a much harder bargain
in the new contracts, either by boosting contract fees or shifting to a profitsharing system under which the collective is guaranteed a certain percentage
of profits. However, under the early contracts, many households have netted
large profits, and unbridled envy has sometimes driven collective leaders to
terminate or modify the terms of contracts unilaterally; in some cases,
peasants, upset at a fellow villager's success, have sabotaged manufacturing
operations or stolen produce or animals. Such actions have prompted
peasants to sue their collectives for breach of contract or interference with the
contract.
Conversely, conflicts have also been caused by households failing to fulfill
their contract duties; for specialized contracts are far more economically risky
than land contracts: Product prices are subject to market fluctuations,
significant capital investment is often necessary, and successful production
requires a higher level of technical skill. In addition, in their eagerness to win
contracts, some households have rashly offered unrealistically high contract
fees. When households have failed to meet contract targets, collectives
usually have terminated the contracts or refused to carry out their own
obligations. Collectives have rarely turned to the courts for redress owing to
the difficulty of collecting a judgment against a peasant and the availability of
administrative "self-help" measures.
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Poor contract drafting has contributed to its share of disputes. Most
specialized contracts are drafted by village or team cadres unaccustomed to
expressing detailed agreements in writing. Oral understandings are not
always reduced to writing. For example, a contract may fail to stipulate that
the collective will supply water each season to the contracting party even
though the parties had so agreed during discussions leading up to the signing
of the contract. Or contract terms are ambiguous-in one case discussed by a
court, a rabbit breeding contract called for the contracting party to return to
the collective a certain number of rabbits, yet failed to specify the rabbits'
gender, size, or age. Yet another major problem has been that many contracts
lack any provision covering damages or remedies in the event one party does
not perform its obligations.
Proper management of valuable and fragile collective resources like fruit
trees has also been an issue of contention. Collective leaders have unilaterally
terminated contracts when they believe the peasant is irresponsibly managing
the resource. If, however, resources are damaged by a natural cause beyond
the control of the peasant, or if a natural calamity renders fulfillment of a
contract impossible, collectives are usually willing to release the peasant from
performance, reduce the contract fee, or extend the contract period. Disputes
under these circumstances are rare.
Most fundamentally, disputes must be attributed to parties' failure to
regard contracts as binding agreements. In the view of Chinese legal
authorities, one of the prime causes of disputes is a "weak sense of law" (fald"
gainian danbo) among both peasants and cadres which leads to the routine
breaking of contracts whenever a party finds it convenient to do so. In
particular, many rural cadres, accustomed to the considerable personal power
they have wielded, have not felt bound by contracts. Press reports about
cadres terminating or modifying contracts at will or seizing property of a
household as punishment for a contract dispute confirm that many cadres
continue to believe their word is the law.' 7
C.

Policy and Laws Relevant to Rural Responsibility Contracts
Laws and administrative regulations have not been instrumental to the
responsibility system reform.
Unlike companion economic reforms
introduced in the Deng era, which have been implemented through numerous
laws and regulations, the responsibility system reform has been implemented
virtually entirely through Party policy.'
During the period from 1978
17. One of the more detailed of the many accounts of local cadres unilaterally terminating
contracts can be found in theJilin Daily, Mar. 2, 1985, at 1, translated in JPRS, CPS-85-058, June 14,
1985.
18. Although the importance of policy in Chinese political and economic life is universally
acknowledged, many commentators do not distinguish between state policy and Party policy. The
two are technically not the same: State policy is the policy of the government, usually given form in
administrative documents of agencies or other governmental bodies, while Party policy is the policy
of the Communist Party of China, which is announced in Party documents that may be publicly
disseminated or circulated only in restricted circles. But the lines between the two types of policy can
become blurred as Party policies are picked up by state organs and reflected in state policies.
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through 1984, as household responsibility farming of both collective grain
land and specialized resources replaced collective management throughout
the country, only one national law bearing on the responsibility system-the
1978 Provisional Work Regulations of the Rural People's Communesappeared.' 9 Party policy, announced through a series of publicly released and
widely disseminated Central Committee documents, has driven and
controlled the reform.
The responsibility system was officially introduced in 1979 by the
"Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on
Some
Questions
Concerning
the
Acceleration
of Agricultural
Development. ' ' 20 On the basis of this policy statement, production teams
throughout the country began experimenting with labor contract systems
under which they assigned production quotas to work groups while retaining
centralized management control over production and distribution of income.
During the next three years, from 1980 to 1982, three major policy statements
of the Central Committee and rural policymakers paved the way for peasant
households to assume increasing control over production. 2' By 1982, full
Furthermore, courts do not appear to distinguish between the two types of policy: Courts sometimes
cite "state policy" (guojia zhengce) even though it is evident they have Party policies regarding the
responsibility system in mind.
19. The Provisional Work Regulations of Rural People's Communes ("Commune Regulations")
were passed on a trial basis by the Third Plenum in 1978 and are reproduced in COLLECTION OF
ECONOMIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 149 (1980). The Commune
Regulations introduced the basic conditions for responsibility systems. The Commune Regulations
stipulated that the basic accounting units of communes (usually production teams) enjoyed the right
to carry out planting based on local conditions, to determine operation and management means, to
allocate their own products, and to resist any "blind direction" by leadership organs. Furthermore,
they mandated that communes base work compensation on the amount of work done rather than
adhere to equal distribution.
20. Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, reproduced in COLLECTION OF
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, LAWS, AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1979, at 1-23
(1983). The Decision was approved in principle at the Third Plenum of the CPCCC in 1978 and
circulated for comment and trial implementation. It was formally promulgated and implemented by
the Fourth Plenum on September 28, 1979.
21. The 1980 Central Committee "Notice Printing and Issuing: [A Summary of] Several
Problems in the Strengthening and Perfecting of the Agricultural Production Responsibility System"
("1980 Notice") sanctioned output responsibility contracting-a form of limited responsibility
contracting in which compensation was directly linked to achievement of production targets-for
specialized resources but discouraged such responsibility contracting for grain land except in remote
and backwards areas. The 1980 Notice is published in COLLECTION OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES,
LAWS, AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1980, at 4-11 (1983).
Specialized contracting was further encouraged by the March 1981 combined Central Committee
and State Council "Notice Transmitting the State Agricultural Committee's 'Report on Actively
Developing Multiple Types of Management in the Countryside' " ("1981 Notice"), which called on
production teams to pursue specialized contracting through the organization of various forms of
specialty teams, groups, households, and labor. Teams were also instructed to use contracts to
encourage individuals or partnerships to run service, handicraft, animal raising, and goods
transportation and sale operations. The 1981 Notice is published in COLLECTION OF AGRICULTURAL
POLICIES, LAWS, AND REGULATIONS OF THE PRC: 1981, at 4-8 (1983).
The 1982 "Summary of the National Rural Work Conference" ("1982 Summary") reiterates
Party backing of full responsibility contracting but also reveals resistance by some rural cadres to the
reform. The 1982 Summary rebutted critics' charges that the system was a return to private farming
and stressed the role of the collective in unifying management and use of land, constructing water
works, accepting state planning guidance, and collecting collective dues. At the same time, though, it
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responsibility contracting of both specialized resources and crop land was
widespread, although opposition to full responsibility contracting still existed
in the Party ranks.
Any lingering doubts about the Party's commitment to full responsibility
contracting were put to rest, however, by two key Party statements, the now
famous Number 1 Documents of 1983 and 1984. The 1983 Number 1
Document took the final step of unconditionally endorsing full responsibility
contracting, stating that "all places where the masses request the
implementation of this system [of contracting out to the household] should
actively support [the system]." '2

2

The 1984 Number 1 Document, 23 the last

Central Committee policy statement to focus on responsibility system
reform, 24 stressed stabilization of contract arrangements by providing that the
contract period of land contracts should be lengthened to fifteen or more
years; contracts for land development or reclamation were to be even longer.
Two other important policy thrusts that have played important roles in
adjudication of responsibility contract disputes were contained in the 1984
Number 1 Document: First, the Document provided that if peasants
requested adjustment of contracts, collectives should make unified decisions
on adjustments according to the principle of "overall stability and minor
adjustments"; 25 second, the Document called for the "active support" of
specialized households, which it described as having "taken the lead in
making themselves rich through hard work, developing commodity
production, and improving production techniques."
National laws and regulations 2 6 governing some aspects of rural contracts
were not promulgated until after the responsibility system and responsibility
contracts had become firmly established in the countryside. Legislation
directly governing some aspect of rural responsibility contracting is currently
stated that full responsibility systems were usually only suitable for products that could be managed
in a decentralized manner; furthermore, brigades whose sideline production generated relatively
large income were instructed not to use full responsibility contracting. The 1982 Summary is
reprinted in Renmin ribao (People's Daily), April 6, 1982, at I & 2.
22. The 1983 Number I Document is reprinted in People's Daily, April 10, 1983, at I & 2.
23. The 1984 Number 1 Document is reprinted in People's Daily, June 12, 1984, at 1 & 2. An
English translation is available in 101 CHINA Q. 132-142 (1985).
24. The Number I Document of 1985 did not focus on the responsibility system, but, marking a
second stage in rural reform, it announced the abolishment of the state mandatory procurement
quotas and the introduction of the contract procurement system It also addressed in greater detail
than previous policy statements the problems of developing marketing channels for farmers. It is
reproduced in RURAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF CHINA (1984), at 1-10 (1986).

25. 1984 Number I Document, at section 3, subsection 1. The purpose of adjustment through
re-assignment was to reduce extreme fragmentation of plots, to take into account changes in a
household's population due to births, deaths, or marriages, and to correct any unfairness in land
assignments that had mistakenly occurred in the early experimental years of the reform.
26. Some regional regulations were promulgated to supplement policy directives. For instance,
in 1984, the Fujian Provincial Government passed "Regulations on Agricultural Contracting
Periods" which specify contracting periods and allow parties to assign contracts for several different
types of natural resources. Another set of 1984 provincial regulations is the Jiangxi Provincial
Government's "Regulations on Conscientiously Protecting the Legal Rights and Interests of Rural
Specialized Households and Supporting Rural Specialized Households' Development of
Commodities Production."

Both sets of regulations are published in CHINESE RURAL LAWS AND

REGULATIONS (1984)-the Fujian Regulations at 82-84 and the Jiangxi Regulations at 84-89.
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limited to certain provisions of the General Principles of Civil Law, 27 of various
land laws, and of the Inheritance Law. 28 Specific regulations on the
responsibility system or responsibility contracts, long planned, have yet to be
promulgated. 2 9 The majority of the provisions do not break new ground, but
serve instead to consolidate the responsibility system reform by statutorily
legitimizing the contracting out of collective- and state-owned resources.
The provisions of the General Principles concerning responsibility
contracting illustrate this statutory legitimization well. Articles 27 and 28
establish that the contract management household is a civil subject whose
rights and interests are protected by law. 30 In this respect, the Principles
affirms existing legal practice: Since courts began accepting responsibility
contract disputes in 1982, they have treated the contract household
management household as an independent civil subject entitled to legal rights
and independently liable for its legal obligations. Similarly, articles 80 and 81
grant legal protection to the right of citizens and collectives to manage under
contract state- and collective-owned land and natural resources. 3 '
27. The General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China ("the General Principles") are
published in an English translation by Gray & Zheng, 34 Am. J. CoMp. L. 715 (1986), and LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1989, at 27. All citations of the General Principles' provisions are based on
Gray & Zheng.
28. The Inheritance Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted at the Third Session of
the Sixth National People's Congress on April 19, 1985, and took effect on October 1, 1985 (the
"Inheritance Law"). To encourage individuals to undertake responsibility contracting, article 4 of
the 1985 Inheritance Law provides: "An individual's earnings from an individual responsibility
contract should be inherited in accordance with this law." Thus, in the event a contracting party dies
during the contracting period, her heirs are entitled to the income from the contract. In the same
spirit of promoting contracting, especially of resources that require long-term investment, article 4
adds that where the law allows an heir to continue a responsibility contract, she may do so as
provided by the contract.
One problem raised by this provision is that many contracts do not contain a clause on
assignment upon death of the contracting party. But it appears that if local regulations do not
prohibit an heir from continuing a contract, and collective leaders feel the heir possesses adequate
production management skills or experience, she will be able to assume the contract. See Legal
Advice Column, Zhongguo fazhibao (China Legal News), May 19, 1986, at 3; and 3 RENMIN SIFA
(PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE)

27-28 (1986).

29. Work on the drafting of regulations on responsibility contracts has been underway since
1984 at the Department of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fisheries; but promulgation of the
regulations has been delayed by both theoretical and practical obstacles. One theoretical dispute has
been, for example, over the relationship of responsibility contracts to economic contracts; this
controversy bears on the extent to which the regulations will draw on the Economic Contract Law.
Practical problems impeding promulgation of regulations have included the still unsettled nature
and function of rural political organizations like the villagers' committees that are involved in the
responsibility contracting process.
30. Article 27 defines contract households as "members of rural collective economic
organizations who, in accordance with provisions of a contract, conduct business with respect to
goods within the scope permitted by law ..
" The "contract" household thus differs from the
"natural" household: It is created by a contractual agreement and includes only those members of a
natural household who actually participate in the business. The definition is a broad one that sweeps
in not only households with specialized contracts but also households with "ordinary" land contracts;
earlier versions of the General Principles had granted legal status only to households contracting for
specialized production. Article 28 states that "the lawful rights and interests of individual
industrial/commercial households and rural contract-operation households are protected by law."
31. Article 80 states: "The right of a citizen or collective to operate according to law under
contract either land owned by a collective or state-owned land that is used by a collective is protected
by law. The rights and duties of both contracting parties are determined by the contract in
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In Chinese legal theory, this "contract management right" (chengbao
jingyingquan) consists of three sub-rights: the right of occupation (zhanyou
quan), the right of utilization (shiyong quan), and the right to benefits (shouyi
quan). 32 The contract household therefore enjoys legally protected rights to
occupy the contracted land or natural resources, rights to use the contracted
property in the manner stipulated by the responsibility contract, and rights to
claim the benefits flowing from the contracted property in the manner
prescribed by the contract. In fact, courts had been protecting contract
households from unauthorized intrusions on their contracted land and
protecting their profits from contracts prior to the appearance of the General
Principles. From the perspective of legal theory, articles 27, 28, 80, and 81 are
significant, for they lay the legal foundation for China's newest form of
agricultural production management. From the perspective of legal practice,
33
they seem destined to have little impact.

accordance with the law." Article 81 states: "The right of citizens or collectives to operate according
to law under contract the forests and woods, mountain land, grassland, undeveloped land,
shorelines, and bodies of water that are owned by a collective or owned by the state and used by a
collective is protected by law. The rights and duties of both contracting parties are determined by
the contract in accordance with law."
32.

See YE, THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT RIGHT 31-33 (1987).

33. The sole new legal rule directly governing responsibility contracts introduced by the General
Principlesaddresses the issue of how obligations of contract households are to be satisfied. Article 29
of the General Principles states: "Obligations of individual industrial/commercial households and rural
contract-operation households are borne by individual property if the business is operated by
individuals, or, if the business is operated by a family, the property of the [members of the] family."
No established judicial practice concerning the property to be used in satisfying contract household
liabilities appears to have existed. The real-world utility of article 29, however, is uncertain, for no
method of distinguishing individual property from family property, practical or legal, presently exists
under Chinese law.
Provisions of land laws concerning responsibility contracting function in the same way as the
General Principles, i.e., they legally fix rural policies rather than establishing new norms. Article 22 of
the Law on Forests of the People's Republic of China ("the Law on Forests") states that state- and
collective-owned barren hillsides and land suitable for afforestation "may be contracted out to
collectives or individuals for afforestation." Article 4 of the Law on Grasslands of the People's
Republic of China ("the Law on Grasslands") states that state- and collective-owned land (as well as
state-owned land that is under stable, long-term collective use) "may be contracted out to collectives
or individuals to engage in animal husbandry production;" and article 12 of the (1986) Law on Land
Management of the People's Republic of China ("the Law on Land Management") provides that
state- or collective-owned land may be contracted out for the purposes of agriculture, forestry,
animal husbandry, or fishery production. Responsibility contracting for all of these purposes,
however, had been practiced for several years prior to the laws' enactment and had been officially
sanctioned in the 1983 Number I Document. The official text of the Law on Forests is published in
the Guowuyuan gongbao ("Bulletin of the State Council") No. 444 (October 10, 1984), at 771; the official
text of the Law on Grasslands in id., No. 470 (July 10, 1985), at 579; and the official text of the (1986)
Law on Land Management in id., No. 505 (July 10, 1986), at 531. (The Law on Land Management
was revised in 1989 and appears in revised form in the Bulletin of the State Council, No. 580 (January
10, 1989), at 873.)
Similarly, the General Principles and the land laws give statutory form to well-established and
frequently reiterated policies on the proper use of state and collective property that is contracted out.
Articles 80 and 81 of the General Principles provide that land, mineral resources, waters, and natural
resources belonging to the state or collectives "may not be bought and sold, leased, mortgaged, or
by any other means illegally transferred." The Law on Land Management, article 12, stipulates that
collectives or individuals who contract to manage land have the duty, in accordance with the contract
provisions, to "reasonably use" the land.
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While the responsibility system reform itself has proceeded essentially in a
non-legal environment, law has played a role in the court resolution of
responsibility contract disputes. As discussed below, after some initial
disagreement about its applicability to rural responsibility contract conflicts,
the Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China ("the
Economic Contract Law"), which took effect in July 1982, 34 has clearly
emerged as a major decisional guide.
D.

The Courts' Recognition of Responsibility Contracts as Legally
Enforceable Agreements

Although some responsibility contract disputes reached courts as early as
1980 and 1981, most courts did not begin hearing the disputes until 1982 or
1983.3 5 Even then, courts initially hesitated as they wrestled with the issue of
whether the contracts were legal agreements to be enforced by the courts or
administrative, "internal" (neibu) agreements between a unit and one of its
subordinates to be regulated by administrative organs under labor law
principles.
The novelty of the contracts and the lack of any law governing them made
this question more difficult to answer. On the one hand, judges
acknowledged that in the formation of the contracts parties enjoyed equal
status and that the contracts created legal rights and duties which should be
enforceable in court. On the other hand, judges believed that since the
contracts were formed between collectives and their members and did not
involve any commodity exchange, they represented an administrative,
superior/subordinate relationship; 36 for this reason, they were more akin to
labor contracts than to economic contracts. Some judges even questioned
whether they were not contracts so much as an administrative means of
management. In addition, some felt that responsibility contracts could not be
considered economic contracts because only one party to the contract (the
collective) was a legal person; the Economic Contract Law defined economic
contracts as agreements between legal persons for the achievement of an
economic purpose. In rebuttal to this position, others pointed to article 54 of
the Economic Contract Law, which states that economic contracts between

34. The official text of the Economic Contract Law is published in the Bulletin of the State Council,
No. 373 Uanuary 25, 1982), at 864. The Law was adopted by the Fourth Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress, Dec. 13, 1981, and took effect on July 1, 1982.
35. Judges of the Supreme People's Court stated that courts throughout the country started
hearing the cases in 1982; one of the courts interviewed by the author stated it did not try the cases
until 1983. However, the author has seen unofficial reports of cases tried in 1980 and 1981.
36. This analysis would seem to lose force, however, with the appearance of responsibility
contracts between collectives and peasants from outside the collective; in such cases it was difficult to
assert that any administrative relationship derived from the parties' status existed, unless one took
the position that administrative relationships could be "stepped into" by the signing of a
responsibility contract.
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rural commune members and legal persons should be carried out in reference
to it.37

Not all of the courts' doubts about accepting responsibility contract
disputes should be attributed to the legal vacuum into which the contracts
arrived. For at least some courts, pragmatic considerations were also a factor.
Courts feared that their limited resources would be overwhelmed by large
numbers of the disputes, and perceived that the disputes would be difficult to
resolve because they were relatively complicated, had policy ramifications,
needed to be handled in a timely fashion, and required taking popular
38
opinion into account.
Despite these doubts, many courts started to accept the disputes in 1982.
It is not known whether the Supreme People's Court issued informal
guidelines at around this time; in some areas, the decision to try responsibility
contract cases appears to have been made by the provincial higher level
courts. For example, in late 1982, the Henan Province Higher People's
Court, responding to an increasing number of queries from lower level
courts, decided that designated basic level and intermediate level courts in the
province were to accept the disputes on an experimental basis; it was not until
1984 that all courts in the province were opened to the disputes.3 9 Courts in
the Beijing, Shijiazhuang, and Chongqing metropolitan areas also began
taking disputes on an experimental basis in 1982.40 Official confirmation of
this practice did not come until March 1984, when the First National
Economic Trial Work Conference organized by the Supreme People's Court
decided that rural responsibility contract disputes fell within the scope of
cases accepted by the economic divisions of courts. 41 By this time, though,
many courts around the country had been handling the disputes for some
time.

E.

The Importance of Dispute Resolution by Administrative Offices

Notwithstanding the decision of the courts to try responsibility contract
disputes, resolution of the disputes-whether a mediated settlement or a
judgment-through the offices of a court remains the exception rather than
37. For a summary of the debate over the nature of responsibility contracts and whether courts
should accept responsibility contract disputes, see, e.g., 2 FAXUE (JURISPRUDENCE) 27-30 (1985).
Though on its face article 54 does appear to cover responsibility contracts, at least those concluded
between a collective and a household belonging to the collective, it was probably drafted with sales
contracts between collectives and peasants, not responsibility contracts, in mind. In 1980-81, at the
time the Economic Contract Law was being drafted, responsibility contracts were relatively new and
Party policy on responsibility contracting was still evolving.
38. See Report of Fenghua County People's Court, Jiangsu Province, in 3 JINGJt FAGUI YANJIU
ZILIAO (RESEARCH MATERIALS ON ECONOMIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS) 24 (1985) [hereinafter
RESEARCH MATERIALS].

39. Interview with Henan Province Higher People's Court officials, November 11, 1986.
40. Interviews with officials of the Beijing Higher People's Court, April 4, 1986, and with a
judge of the Zhengding County basic level court, October 22, 1986; see also Liu, Contract Disputes, in 3
WE1DING GAO (DRAFT PAPERS)

23 (1985).

41. See "Notice on Strengthening Economic Trial Work," issued by the Supreme People's Court
and summarized in China Legal News, December 11, 1985, at 2.
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the rule. When disputes flare up, few aggrieved parties immediately consider
pressing their rights through legal action. If the aggrieved party is a peasant
household, it will normally appeal for help to local government or Party
officials (who are often one and the same in rural areas) such as local Party
secretaries, township government cadres, and members of the county Party
Committee. It is usually only when no help is forthcoming from these
traditional centers of rural authority that a peasant may finally turn to the
courts; whether he decides to sue or not depends on his awareness of his legal
rights, his willingness to endanger relations with collective leaders, and his
perceptions of the local court. If the dissatisfied party is a collective, it will
often use its considerable administrative powers to rectify the perceived
wrong; for instance, it may freeze the account of the enterprise managed by
the peasant or refuse to supply the peasant with production inputs such as
water, electricity, or fertilizer.
Even if parties decide to bring suit, courts will often turn cases over to
administrative departments-usually the township government (if it is not a
party to the dispute) or the district government-for resolution. 4 2 Since
resolution by administrative organs usually consists of mediation-on
occasion, if parties are unable to reach an agreement, the administrative
organ may render a decision that is non-binding on the participants-court
preference for administrative resolution of disputes may be interpreted as a
manifestation of traditional Chinese preference for non-confrontational
conflict resolution.
In the case of rural responsibility contracts, however, the courts'
preference for administrative handling of disputes also is based on their belief
that local governments are best equipped to handle the disputes. This belief
rests on several grounds: First, courts reason that since the handling of this
type of conflict may have wide-ranging repercussions, the authority and
regional perspective of a local government is needed; second, courts feel that
local governments will be more familiar with the disputants and local
circumstances; and third, courts believe that the administrative relationship
between a local government and disputants will simplify investigation of the
43
case's facts and enforcement of a resolution.
Courts interviewed by the author uniformly stressed that resolution
through administrative channels continues to be strongly encouraged but is
not mandatory; a party retains the right to sue in court if it wishes.
Furthermore, because of the national policy of strongly protecting the rights
of specialized households, 44 courts may be relatively willing to hear
controversies involving specialized households. 4 5 At the same time, it also
appears that some courts have had a policy of not accepting a dispute until
42. Courts usually will do this by refusing to accept the dispute; in some instances, however,
courts may initially accept a dispute but subsequently ask the local government to take the lead in
resolving the dispute.
43. See Report of Fenghua County Court, 3 RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 38, at 24 & 27.
44. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
45. See Report of Fenghua County Court, supra note 43, at 28.
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adminstrative organs have first tried to resolve it;46 and in some cases where
court proceedings are already underway, courts may "persuade" parties to
accept administrative efforts at settlement by notifying the parties that it will
halt court proceedings until administrative means have been tried. In the case
involving an orange grove contract described in detail below, 47 the court
informed the plaintiffis lawyers that it would suspend its involvement in the
dispute and let the township government attempt to resolve it; if its efforts
failed, then the court would proceed to render a judgment. When informed
of the court's decision, the plaintiff expressed misgivings about having the
township government intervene but eventually agreed to this course of action
at the urging of his lawyer, who reassured him that he could refuse to accept
the government's proposed resolution. Had the plaintiff insisted that the
court continue its proceedings, the court probably would have relented, but
with prejudice to the plaintiff.
III
NORMS AND OTHER FACTORS THAT HAVE GUIDED COURTS IN THE
ADJUDICATION OF RURAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACT
DISPUTES

Analysis of the rules and other decisional bases that guide Chinese courts
in their adjudication of economic disputes, including responsibility contract
conflicts, must be conducted cautiously. Two problems complicate the
inquiry: the continuing role of the Party in dictating court decisions and the
limited nature of currently available materials on the judicial process.
Party domination of judicial affairs has characterized political-judicial
relations since the founding of the PRC. Judicial independence, established
in principle by the 1954 Constitution during the mid-1950's movement to
develop socialist legality in China, has never existed in practice. Even during
that short-lived period of legal institution-building, the Party, if it did not
directly intervene in court decisionmaking, exerted control over the judiciary
through control over judicial personnel. 48 Party monitoring of and control
over the judicial process today continues through the political-legal
committees that have been established at various level to review judicial work.
This lack of judicial autonomy suggests that a quest to find the standards or
rules that guide judicial decisionmaking is simply superfluous, or worse,
potentially misleading: If the Party determines all judicial outcomes (or
nearly all), then court reference to laws, administrative regulations, policy, or
other decisional guides is largely an exercise in form.
But there is reason to believe that the Party today no longer systematically
intervenes in all, or the great majority of, civil lawsuits. Since the epochal
46.

See Shui, An Opinion on the Handling of Agricultural Production System Contract Disputes, 3 FAXUE
57 (1984).
See text accompanying note 92.
See Baum, Modernization and Legal Reform in Post-Alao China. The Re-birth of Socialist Legality, XIX
IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM 69, 78 (1986). See also id. at 79-80, 83, and 91-92.
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Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, which called for
construction of a strong legal system, Party intervention in ordinary judicial
matters has been openly criticized 49 and the government has implemented
measures, including the training of professional judges, to strengthen the
judicial system. From a practical perspective, the sheer volume of cases
accepted by the courts in recent years seems to preclude the possibility of
Party review of all disputes. On the basis of these developments, it seems
justifiable to posit that Party intervention in court decisionmaking has
decreased to some degree, 50 thus leaving Chinese judges with some, if closely
circumscribed, autonomy to determine how a case should be handled and
51
some latitude to look to different sources of rules or authority for guidance.
The following analysis is based on this assumption. In the author's opinion, a
study of decisional factors can contribute to an understanding of the civil
adjudication process in China; however, the search for norms or other factors
that guide judges must be anchored in the acknowledgment that they may
frequently or occasionally be secondary or irrelevant in a judicial system that
is still very closely controlled by members of the ruling political elite.
Research constraints also significantly limit the depth of any study on the
process by which Chinese courts reach their decisions. Access to primary
judicial materials and judicial personnel is extremely limited. The Chinese
judicial system remains essentially a closed institution, largely impenetrable
not only to foreigners but also to most Chinese. With the exception of
occasional cases deemed to be of general instructional value that are
published in the Bulletin of the Supreme People's Court, copies of court decisions
49. See id. at 91-92, citing media articles and statements of legal officials calling for greater
judicial independence. For a prominent jurist's statement that there should be less Party
involvement injudicial work, see Chen, Thirty Years of Legal Studies, translated in 2J. CHIN. L. 181, 195
(1988).
50. On the other hand, Party involvement is certain in cases that are politically sensitive, raise
novel questions of law or policy, or center on large sums of money or large enterprises. In such
cases, courts will routinely consult with local Party officials as well as with the superior court.
Furthermore, local Party leaders may sometimes use their power to block court action. For example,
in one case reported from Jilin Province, despite donations by the contracting household to his
collective to quell leaders' and villagers' grumblings over his profitable orchards, the production
brigade seized the orchards and re-contracted them out to three groups. When the peasant sued the
brigade, county and district Party committee leaders repeatedly intervened, even over contrary
instructions from higher authorities, to block adjudication of the case by the county court. The
county Party committee then made its own determination that the contract was invalid and
unilaterally rescinded it. Although the subsequent course of developments is not entirely clear, this
incident apparently was brought to the attention of higher Party authorities, who ordered the county
committee to restore the contract and to allow the county court to try the case. Interestingly, no
account of the case's outcome is given. See U.S. JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE 77-82 (June
14, 1985).
51. Diminished Party intervention in judicial decisionmaking does not imply that individual
judges or individual courts reach decisions completely on their own. On the contrary, consultation
among judges or different courts is the norm. Individual judges will almost always consult the head
judge of the court-or the head judge will impose his opinion-before handing down a decision or
taking a stance in a dispute. And if a dispute is large or complex enough, lower courts will ask for
instructions (qingshi) on how to proceed from their superior court. But the fact that the judgment
rendered, or settlement negotiated, by a court reflects the views of more senior members of a court
or higher court instead of the judge presiding over the case should not affect an analysis of the
factors that influence judicial decisionmaking in general.
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are not published, 52 and even Chinese law specialists cannot count on access
to them. Despite the Code of Civil Procedure's provision that trials, unless
they involve state secrets or private matters, are to be publicly conducted,
only a handful of pre-selected trials are conducted publicly. 53 Judges do not
publicly comment on decisions of their courts. Faced with this situation, the
researcher is forced to rely on secondary sources-articles in legal journals,
newspaper reports, and published collections of cases-which are usually
simplified accounts that provide only a glimpse into the judicial process.
Even for those fortunate enough to be in possession of actual court
opinions, knowledge of the reasoning process behind decisions remains
elusive owing to the summary nature of most Chinese court opinions.
Opinions do not contain the detailed and often complex legal reasoning that
characterize opinions of common law courts. They typically consist of only a
brief recital of the case's main facts, a few sentences summarizing the
procedural history of the case (procedural issues are rarely discussed in any
detail), a summary of the court's investigation, and a concluding paragraph or
two stating the court's ruling. Legal bases for the decision may be cited in this
last section. The court's rationale for applying a law or interpreting a law in a
particular way is not given. While policies, laws, and administrative
regulations are cited as bases for decisions, other factors that may have guided
the court-for example, Supreme Court guidelines concerning handling of a
certain type of dispute or equitable principles-are not explicitly mentioned,
though a court's reliance on them may be inferred from the opinion.
Much of the analysis below is based on published reports of responsibility
contract cases and is subject to the inherent limitations described above.
Thus, to supplement this material, the analysis also draws from two other
types of sources: (1) interviews conducted by the author with the basic level
court of Zhengding County near Shijiazhuang, the basic level court of Yixing
County near Wuxi, the intermediate court of Beijing, the higher court of
Henan Province, and the Supreme People's Court; 54 and (2) a small number
of materials that have not been publicly circulated.
52. Even were the judicial system to evolve into a more transparent one-recently there have
been calls for greater judicial openness-materials for analyzing the judicial process will remain
scanty as long as Chinese legal authorities rigidly adhere to the reasoning that since courts do not
make law, there is no need to publish decisions other than the occasional one of special significance.
While this attitude would seem to ignore the goal of consistency in decisionmaking, it is possible that
Chinese authorities believe that consistency can be achieved through internal dissemination of
guiding cases, internal distribution of Supreme Court guidelines, judicial work conferences, and
other non-public means of informing judges about proper interpretation of laws. Obviously, these
internal directives or guidelines will not aid disputants or lawyers.
53. Article 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic of China ("Code of Civil
Procedure") stipulates that the trial of civil cases by the people's court shall be conducted openly,
except for certain cases which involve state secrets or personal private matters, or cases which the law
stipulates shall not be conducted openly.
54. China's judicial system consists of four levels of courts: basic level (jiceng) courts, which are
the courts of first instance for smaller disputes; intermediate (zhongi) courts, which review the
decisions of basic level courts and also serve as the courts of first instance in disputes involving
foreign parties and in larger, more complex, and more sensitive disputes; higher (gaoji) courts, which
review decisions of inferior courts and act as the courts of first instance for cases that are of
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Chinese courts appear to be guided in their handling of responsibility
contract disputes by a number of different sources of authority, some legal in
nature, some not. These decisional guides fall into four categories: Party
policies; legal norms, among which the most important is the Economic
Contract Law; the basic principle of fairness in contractual relations and
commercial dealings; and the opinions of local government or administrative
offices.
A.

Party Policies

The courts' handling of responsibility contract disputes has been guided
first and foremost by Party policies on rural responsibility contracting.
Judicial attention to Party policies on responsibility contracting is indicated by
citation to policy in case reports, frequent references in court-authored
commentaries on contract disputes to policy as a guide, 55 and the comments
of courts interviewed by the author. 5 6 Close identification of rural
responsibility contracts with national Party policies and the absence of any
laws or regulations specifically governing the contracts has led to an unusually
critical role for policy in court decisionmaking.
The judiciary's protection of the rights of contract households through
enforcement of responsibility contracts which collectives attempt unilaterally
to terminate or modify, frequently reported in the press during 1984 and

1985, has been a policy-driven response. Two of the major themes stressed
by Party policy during 1982-85, the period from which most of the cases
described in this article are drawn, were: (1) "stabilization" of responsibility
contract arrangements, that is, clarification of rights and duties under existing
contracts and the avoidance of major shifts in contract arrangements; and (2)
the protection of the lawful interests of specialized households. Party leaders
in charge of agriculture believed these policies were essential for increasing
productivity, encouraging investment in land and other agricultural
resources, and furthering specialization-the development forces which were
to transform a subsistence economy to a commodity economy and lift the
Chinese peasantry from poverty. A clear corollary of these policies was the
legal protection of responsibility contracts and the rights of contract
households against the arbitrary actions of rural cadres. These policy
significant import in the region under its jurisdiction; and the Supreme People's Court, the highest
appellate court and the court of first instance for cases that are of national significance and other
cases that it determines should be tried by it. There are no set monetary limits that determine
jurisdiction over disputes. Most rural responsibility contract disputes involve relatively small
amounts of money-less than 10,000 yuan (approximately 2700 U.S. dollars) and often only a few
thousand yuan-and are thus tried by basic level, county courts.
55. See, e.g., the report of the Jinzhou Intermediate Court of Liaoning Province, A Concise
Discussion of the Handling of Rural Production-Linked Responsibility Contract Disputes: The Issue of Applicable
Law, in 3 RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 38, at 12. In addition to stating that policy can be a basis
for deciding disputes when there is no applicable law, the court remarks that responsibility contract
disputes carry strong policy ramifications.
56. The Beijing Intermediate Court, for example, stated that the handling of responsibility
contract cases was largely determined by policy. Other courts stated that policy was an important
guide, particularly the Number 1 Documents of 1983 and 1984.
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priorities 5 7 were not lost on the courts which began to render decisions in
favor of households in cases where collective leaders, resentful of peasants'
profitable operations, unilaterally terminated or modified contracts or
58
physically interfered so as to make performance of the contract impossible.
Not only were these decisions publicized in mass media to demonstrate to
Chinese citizens that responsibility contracts would receive legal protection;
they were also documented in local Party and judicial documents for the
edification of Party and judicial cadres. 59
The primacy of Party policy in the judicial decisionmaking process is also
demonstrated by cases in which courts have supported the termination or
modification of contracts by collective leaders because the leaders were
responding to new policy priorities.

Indeed, one judge of the Supreme

People's Court who has specialized in the handling of responsibility contract
disputes has written that when policies or laws change, courts may need to
terminate or modify contracts. 60 Thus, in certain cases, courts have ruled
against peasants demanding continuation of a contract even though the
collective appears to be breaching the contract in violation of Economic
Contract Law rules.
One illustration of this is a 1983 dispute from Fenghua County in Zhejiang
Province. The dispute arose when, during implementation of the reform
policy of dismantling communes and establishing separate township
governments and cooperative economic organizations in their stead, 6 ' the
management committee of the brigade in Fenghua was changed to a villagers'
committee (cunmin weiyuanhui) and ownership of tea-growing land originally
owned and managed by the brigade transferred to six separate villagers'
groups (cunmin zu) under the new villagers' committee. To consummate the
structural re-organization, the villagers' committee then unilaterally
terminated a responsibility contract for the tea-growing land which its
predecessor, the management committee, had signed with fourteen
57. It seems quite possible that Party directives on the protection of contracts were sent directly
to courts, either through the Supreme Court or through local Party committees.
58. See, e.g., China Daily, June 9, 1983 (court ruling orchard contract of eight peasants protected
from unilateral revocation by cadres in Henan); report of Yueyin District Intermediate Court, 5
FAzHI YUEKAN (LEGAL SYSTEM MONTHLY) 12-13 (1985); Fujian ribao (Fujian Daily), April 1, 1983;
report of Hubei Province Higher Court, I FAXUE PINGLUN (LEGAL STUDIES COMMENTARY) 35-39

(1985); and three cases reported by Zweig et al., supra note 16, at 340-46, 351-52, in which courts,
ruling in favor of households suing the collective representatives, upheld specialized contracts.
59. For example, one document read by the author, a report circulated by an intermediate court
on a specialized contract in which the contract household prevailed, was entitled "Utilize Legal
Weapons" and "Protect the Legal Rights and Interests of Specialized Contract Households."
60. See SHEN, How TO HANDLE RURAL AND URBAN RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACT DISPUTES 25 (1987).
61. Beginning in 1982, in order to separate governmental and economic functions that up to
then had been combined in the commune, communes across the country were dismantled.
Governmental functions were vested in newly created township people's governments (at the level of
former communes) and villagers' committees (at the level of former brigades) were established as
grass-roots, self-governance units. In a number of areas, however, villagers' committees actually
functioned as local arms of the township government. The economic functions of communes were
vested in newly established cooperative economic organizations at various levels; the names and
levels of the organizations vary from locality to locality.
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households. It also demanded that the households add an extra 3800 yuan
payment to the past year's contract fee. The court, citing the Economic
Contract Law, decided that the villagers' committee must assume
responsibility for the breach of the contract 6 2 and ordered it to return the
3800 yuan. However, citing the "spirit" of the 1983 Number 1 Documentwhich had specifically called for commune restructuring 6 3 -other Central
Committee Party "policy regulations" (zhengce guiding) concerning the
restructuring that it did not specifically name, and the demands of the "actual
situation," which necessitated transferring ownership and management rights
from the brigade (villagers' committee ) level down to the village group level,
the court also ruled that the contract could not be continued. The court
reporting this case cited it as an example of how to handle the relationship
64
between the Economic Contract Law and current policies.
General land contracts have been even more susceptible to evolving
policy. The 1984 Number 1 Document, which stipulated that the period for
land contracts was to be extended to fifteen years or more, also added that
prior to the extension of contracts, "if the masses requested adjustment of
land (allocations and contracts)," the collective could adjust contracts
following the principle of "overall stability and minor adjustments." In fact,
adjustment of contracts was usually initiated by collective leaders with
acquiescence by households. In one reported case where a peasant refused
the collective's request that he give up part of the land he had contracted for
because the size of his household had decreased, the court ruled that the
contract was no longer valid and recognized a new contract for the land that
the collective had signed with another party. It based this decision on its
finding that the termination of the first contract accorded with the policy of
"minor adjustments."-6 5

When a court uses policy to reach a decision, it may explicitly state that it

has reached its conclusion on the basis of policy. Any reference to policy,
however, is likely to be general. Thus, a court will usually simply state that the
type of contract before it should be upheld and protected or note that a
party's action was proper because the contract or action accords with "policy"
or the spirit of policy. It will not cite specific provisions of a policy document.
Where courts have cited specific policies, those policies have been the 1983
and 1984 Number 1 Documents. Moreover, due to the inherent generality of
policy, the specific solution to a conflict that a court devises depends more on
its own sense of what is fair, relevant local regulations, and local conditions62. The court's report did not state if the committee had to pay compensation for the breach.
63. See section 5 of the 1983 Number 1 Document.
64. The court's report of the case is published in 11 RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 38, at 2829. Unfortunately, the report gives no explanation of why ownership rights had to be adjusted as
part of the adjustment. Furthermore, it is not clear why, even with the ownership change, the
villagers' committee could not continue the contract: It has been common for villagers' committees
to act as the party contracting out land even where the land is technically owned by villagers' groups.
65.

See 5 LEGAL SYSTEM MONTHLY 13 (1985).
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including the opinions of local administrative or government leaders-than
on policy.
These points are illustrated by a case from Xinjiang involving a dispute
between a farm laborer who orally contracted to plant wheat on land he had
reclaimed and his team leader, who subsequently denied there had been any
agreement and ordered that the wheat be distributed equally among all
members of the collective. Although the local bureau in charge of farms
worked out a compromise arrangement, the laborer was forced to sue when
the agreement was violated by members of the collective. The court declared
that contracting to reclaim and plant barren land was permitted by state policy
and should therefore be supported and protected, that the "oral agreement"
was legal (although no specific law is cited), and that any responsibility for the
contract's incompleteness lay with the leaders of the team. It then mediated a
settlement under which the parties agreed to abide by the compromise
arrangement and the defendant team leader agreed to pay the laborer the
66
bonus stipulated by the contract for surplus production.
In some cases, the courts do not explicitly acknowledge the role of policy
but nonetheless appear to base their decisions on policy grounds. Courts will,
for example, refuse to uphold contracts where there has been manipulation of
the bidding process for the contract. An important principle of the
responsibility contract system is that contracts, both land and specialized
ones, are to be concluded through democratic processes; the 1982 "Summary
of the National Work Conference 6 7 states that "the signing of contracts shall
be done through democratic consultation." 68 In other words, the awarding of
contracts is to be free of nepotism or favoritism. On the basis of this policy,
courts will find contracts void if there have been bidding irregularities. Thus,
in one Henan Province case, the court refused to uphold the apple orchard
contract of a party who had won the contract by submitting a bid, apparently
approved by the team leader, which stated "ten yuan more than the highest
bidder."69

Similarly, courts will allow a collective to terminate a contract if they are
convinced that the contracting party is guilty of exploitative management of
the collective's resources. Another important principle of the responsibility
system has been that the contracting party's right to use collective land and
natural resources is conditional on its proper use and preservation. Judges of
the Beijing Intermediate Court cited exploitative management as a violation
of state policy. 70 Thus, even if the contract itself does not state that the
contracting party must refrain from unauthorized chopping of trees,
premature picking of fruit, overmining, or other types of exploitative resource
use, courts will terminate contracts if there is evidence of such exploitation.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See SHEN, supra note 60, at 26-27.
See note 22 supra.
Section 6 of the 1982 Summary.
Nongmin ribao (Peasant's Daily), March 28, 1986, at 3.
Interview with officials of the court, April 8, 1986.
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Protection of the state and collective's economic interests is another policy
that may lead courts to modify contracts. This policy is summarized in the
phrase of "taking care of three [interests] at the same time" (sanfiangu), or
the principle that the responsibility system must consider concurrently the
interests of the state, the collective, and the individual. 7 1 Specifically, the
state interest is the contract's production quota (where there is one) and rural
development; the collective interest, the collective dues (for land contracts),
or the contract fee (for specialized contracts), and protection of its resources;
and the individual interest, his contract rights, including profits from
management of the resource. Although they did not cite any specific cases,
the Henan Province Higher Court and the Beijing Intermediate Court stated
that they would be prepared to modify a contract where unanticipated price
changes had created a windfall to the contracting party. However, both courts
stressed that they would first attempt to persuade the contracting party to
72
modify the contract terms voluntarily.
Two very important final points concerning the role of policy in
responsibility contract disputes remain to be made. First, policy's general
nature makes it a very flexible tool in the hands of the courts. The existence
of universally studied, major policy statements, such as the Number 1
Documents for the rural responsibility system, does not necessarily bring
uniform results in courtrooms across the country. Even though courts will
always consider policy when approaching a dispute, their interpretations of
policy-how it applies to a given situation-can vary. Thus, in a case from
Ningxia, a court faced with the interpretation and application of the 1983
Number 1 Document reached the opposite result from the one which the
Feng Hua court reached. It concluded that the policy of perfecting the
responsibility system called for in the Document did not require termination
of a contract. The court rejected the defendant's argument that its unilateral
termination of a contract had been correct because the 1983 Number 1
Document emphasized the need to improve the responsibility system. It
supported instead the plaintiffs position that it was a distortion of Party policy
and a violation of the Economic Contract Law to treat the termination or
modification of a contract at will as an effort to perfect the responsibility
system. The court ruled that the contract would be upheld and was to be
performed under its original terms.
Admittedly, the circumstances of this case differed from those of the
Fenghua case; it appears that the defendant's main motive for ending the
contract was not to improve management of the orchards, a purpose that
might have received the court's approval, but to deprive the plaintiff of large
profits he was reaping under the contract. Had the defendant's motives been
71. See, e.g., section 7, point 6, of the 1983 Number I Document. See also the remarks of Du
Runsheng, in Du,supra note 10, at 65, on the issue of unifying the interest of the individual with the
interests of the state and collective.
72. See text accompanying note 103 infra for another perspective on courts' willingness to
modify contracts in these circumstances.
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purer, the Ningxia court might have chosen to end the contract, as did the
Feng Hua court. Nonetheless, the contrast between the two cases shows the
great leeway courts have in applying policy to specific situations.
Second, courts generally will not base their decisions on policy when they
can use the Economic Contract Law or administrative regulations to resolve
the dispute and the results of applying the Economic Contract Law or
regulations would not contravene policy. In other words, if a provision of the
Economic Contract Law or a regulation addresses the issue at the root of a
conflict, a court will apply it as long as it is convinced the result furthers
policy. Thus, most reported decisions have rested on the Economic Contract
Law rather than on policy, though there is reason to believe that legal rules
are subordinate to policy goals and that policy considerations generally shape
the approach of courts toward disputes.
Courts apply law whenever possible for both theoretical and practical
reasons. Theoretically, the use of law is called for because law represents a
"fixing" of policy, in a specific and relatively stable form, after the wisdom of
that policy has been confirmed. 73 Thus, where Chinese law contains a
provision addressing the legal issue, the provision should be applied; policy
need be consulted only where no applicable law exists. 7 4 Additionally, law, an
expression of state will, is mandatory in nature and courts are the state organs
responsible for enforcement of state laws. In contrast, the implementation of
policy is not ajob for the courts: Theory holds that policy, the means through
which the Party exercises its leadership of the state, is only directive and
should be implemented primarily through persuasion, education,
encouragement, and the example of Party members. 7 5 Practically, courts use
a law when appropriate because it is more specific than policy, providing a
rule in comparison to a general principle. Courts may also favor law-based
decisions under the reasoning that since peasants believe law is less likely to
change than policy, a decision based on legal rules will do the most to
convince peasants that their contracts will be protected.
B.

Legal Bases: The Economic Contract Law and Administrative
Regulations

In the absence of any laws or regulations
1. The Economic Contract Law.
specifically governing responsibility contracts, courts have relied on the
Economic Contract Law as a source of legal standards to apply to disputes.
Although the introduction of responsibility contracts sparked a debate in
academic and judicial circles on the "nature" of the contracts and the
question of whether the Economic Contract Law governed them, 76 case
73. See, e.g., CHEN & ZHANG, BASIC THEORY OF JURISPRUDENCE 234 (1981).
74. See, e.g., article 6 of the General Principles, which states: "Civil activities must be in conformity
with the law; where there is no provision of the law, activities must conform with state policy."
75. CHEN & ZHANG, supra note 73, at 229.
76. The "nature" of responsibility contracts and the question of what substantive law governs
the contracts has been much discussed by legal writers. Moreover, debate has not been limited to
academic circles. In a 1985 meeting on responsibility contracts (both enterprise and agricultural)
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reports from 1982 on show that courts have been regularly resting their
decisions on Economic Contract Law provisions. However, most court
discussions of responsibility contract disputes state that the court refers to the
Economic Contract Law for guidance but does not consider it controlling
because responsibility contracts differ in certain ways from economic
contracts. 77 In this guiding role, then, the Economic Contract Law appears to
have served two functions: First, it has furnished the judiciary with general
principles of contract law, and second, it has provided specific rules for
78
specific situations.
One of the functions of the Economic Contract Law has been to provide a
statutory basis for fundamental principles of contract law such as the binding
nature of contracts and their legal enforceability. The first chapter of the
Economic Contract Law enumerates a number of "general principles."
* Article 3 establishes that economic contracts must be in written
form (except for contracts that are to be fulfilled immediately).
" Article 4 provides that the formation of economic contracts shall
conform to state laws and accord with state policies and plans.
* Article 5 provides that the formation of economic contracts shall
be based on the principle of equality, mutual benefit, agreement
through consultation, and equal value of compensation, and that,
furthermore, neither party shall impose its will on the other party,
nor shall any unit or individual illegally interfere with contracts.
* Article 6 provides that economic contracts are legally binding once
they are established, that parties shall fulfill their duties under the
contract, and that neither party shall be allowed to terminate or
modify contracts without authorization.

attended by economic trial judges, some individuals expressed the opinion that the contracts'
specific contents, as long as they did not violate the principles of the Central Committee's Number I
Documents, should be the sole legal basis for handling disputes. See REFERENCE MATERIALS ON
ECONOMIC TRIAL WORK (1985), published and edited by the Supreme People's Court. No

uncertainty over applicable procedural law has existed; courts have applied the Code of Civil
Procedure. Some courts have noted, however, that the Code of Civil Procedure fails to cover the
issue of how to treat responsibility contract partnerships procedurally, including the problem of one
partner appearing in court purportedly on behalf of the partnership. These issues are dealt with in
the 1986 Supreme Court Opinion on the handling of responsibility contract disputes. See text
accompanying note 88 infra.
77. Unfortunately, courts do not elaborate on how their handling of responsibility contract
disputes differs from their approach to economic contract disputes. One judge indicated in an
interview that the court would take into account the household's obligation, as a subordinate subject
of the collective, to obey collective directives regarding reasonable management of the contractedout land or resources.
78. See, for example, a report of the Jinzhou Intermediate Court of Liaoning Province stating
that "in substantive law, during the time that the state has not formulated and promulgated
regulations on agricultural production-linked contracts, . . . [our] administrative arbitration and
judicial trial practice has shown that conscientiously implementing the basic principles and specific
articles of the 'Economic Contract Law of the PRC' has been effective." 11 RESEARCH MATERIALS,
supra note 38, at 11.
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* Article 7 stipulates economic contracts that are invalid (wuxiao), or
79
void ab initio.
Courts have frequently rested their decisions on these general principles.
For example, articles 5 and 6 have furnished courts with a firm statutory basis
for enforcing contracts and imposing liability on parties who refuse to
perform or unilaterally modify or terminate contracts. Court opinions in
which courts decide to uphold contracts often cite these two articles. A typical
example is a Zhejiang case where, after signing a peach orchard responsibility
contract, collective leaders seized the revenues of the contracting peasants
and also tried to raise the contract fee because they felt the peasants were
becoming rich at the collective's expense. The peasant sued the leaders for
breach of the contract. The court held that according to articles 5 and 6 of the
Contract Law, economic contracts established in accordance with law were
legally binding, both parties were obligated to completely perform their
contract duties, and neither party could modify or terminate the contract at
will. It thus ordered the leaders to return the seized funds and to honor the
contract to the end of its three-year period. 0
When confronted with rural responsibility contract disputes, one of the
first analyses a court will make is whether the contract is a valid one that
should be enforced. 8 ' Article 7 of the Economic Contract Law routinely
guides courts in this analysis; thus, courts determine if the contract violates
laws or state policies, was induced through fraud or coercion, was signed by
an agent who exceeded the scope of his authority, or violates state or public
interest. Yet article 7 serves more as a starting point for judicial scrutiny of
contracts than as a rigid rule; in their analyses, courts often also cite
additional circumstances that will render a contract invalid, such as
assignment of a contract by the contracting household without prior consent
79. Article 7. Chinese contract law theory does not appear to distinguish between void (invalid)
contracts and voidable contracts. The Chinese term wuxiao helong, at least as it is used in the
Economic Contract Law, should be translated as void or invalid contract because the Law states that
such contracts do not have any legal force from the moment they are made. See article 7.
80. See case reported in SHEN, supra note 60, at 19. See also id. at 22-23 for a similar case where
peasants who were envious of a fellow villager's prosperity from the management of a brick kiln
persuaded the team leader to drive the peasant away from the kiln, sell his car, and seize materials
from the factory. The contracting peasant sued the team. The court ruled in favor of the peasant,
finding that, since the contract accorded with the basic principles of the Economic Contract Law, it
was legally binding and the team leader had unlawfully interfered with the autonomy and
management rights granted by the contract to the peasant. See also id. at 40 for a similar case where
the court upheld an apple orchard contract which collective leaders had unilaterally terminated. This
case was made more complicated by the fact that the leaders had, with the approval of the township
government, re-contracted out the orchard to another peasant following the attempted termination
of the first contract. The second peasant had invested money in the care of the orchard and was on
the verge of harvesting the apples. With these two facts in mind, the court helped negotiate a
settlement under which: 1) the plaintiff agreed to let the third party continue management of the
orchards for the year in progress and to keep profits from that year; 2) the plaintiffagreed to pay the
third party 50 yuan as reimbursement for the care of some seedlings; 3) the plaintiff would reassume management of the orchard the year after; and 4) the plaintiff's original contract would be
extended by a year. The editor of the book inserted this case to illustrate the point that the rights of
innocent third parties should also be taken into consideration by courts. For a third example, see id.
at 29.
81. See id. at 101-102.
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of the collective, use of the powers of political office to force the signing of a
contract, use of powers of political office to obtain contracts with artificially
low contract fees for friends and relatives, and contracting out without
democratic discussion by the masses. 82 In essence, courts have grafted policy
considerations pertaining to responsibility contracts onto the analytical
framework of the Economic Contract Law.
Courts have also referred to the Economic Contract Law for more narrow
rules addressing specific issues. For example, courts have frequently based
their decisions on the rules on responsibility for breach of contracts set forth
in articles 32, 35, and 36. Article 32 states that liability for breach of
economic contracts must be assumed by the party whose mistakes prevent
partial or full contract performance; furthermore, where both parties have
made mistakes, liability must be allocated between the parties according to
the actual (specific) circumstances. In one case from a Beijing suburb,
households who had contracted to manage vegetable plots sued their
collective for allegedly reducing their production by failing to provide
sufficient water in the first half of the year and flooding the crops during the
second half of the year. Upon investigation, the court determined that the
underwatering was a result of the households' own negligence. However, it
also concluded that later crop losses were partially the fault of the collective,
which had inadvertently flooded the households' lands twice. Citing article
32, it refused to impose liability for losses incurred during the first part of the
losses would
year on the collective but ruled that liability for the8 subsequent
3
be split between the households and the collective.
Another provision of the Economic Contract Law governing modification
and termination of contracts is article 28, which states: "Notices or
agreements of the modification or termination of a contract should assume a
written form (including a document or telegram)." On the basis of this
provision, courts have refused to recognize oral modifications or terminations
of contracts where the contents of the oral agreement cannot be proved. For
example, in one case, an intermediate court annulled a lower court's ruling
that had been based on the analysis that the defendant had not honored an
oral agreement modifying the contract. In refusing to give legal effect to the
oral agreement and finding that the original contract was still effective, the
higher court cited article 28's requirement that modification or termination be
84
written.
Article 31 concerning modification and termination of contracts has also
been an important rule for the courts. Citing article 31, which stipulates that
"[a]fter an economic contract has been signed, it shall not be modified or
terminated because the person involved in the signing or the legal
82.

Interviews with judges of the Supreme Court and the Beijing Intermediate Court. See id.

83. The parties settled, with the collective agreeing to pay one-half of the losses incurred in the
second half of the year and the households agreeing to pay the original contract fee in full. See id. at

20. For a court decision drawing on articles 32 and 35, see id.at 36-37.
84. A Judgment that Protects ContractingParties' Legal Rights and Interests, China Legal News, June 4,
1984, at 3. But compare this case with one discussed infra at text following note 102.
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representative has been replaced," courts have disallowed leadership changes
as a justification for unilateral abrogation of contracts. Many areas have
experienced changes in the leadership of rural administrative organs in the
wake of the dismantling of the commune system and its replacement with
township governments, villagers' committees, and various types of
cooperative economic organizations.8 5 One major cause of responsibility
contract disputes has been the refusal of new leaders to honor contracts
signed by their predecessors.
Courts have protected contracting parties against such contract breaches.
For example, in one dispute that occurred in a village outside of Xining City
in Qinghai Province, several peasants signed a contract to manage their
village's brick factory. Two years into the contract, the brigade management
committee was changed into a villagers' committee and new leaders were
appointed. The new leaders decided to cancel the original contract and
contracted out the factory to another party. After unsuccessful attempts by
the township government and the district Bureau of Industrial and
Commercial Administration to resolve the dispute, the peasants brought suit
in the Xining Intermediate Court. The court ruled that the change in the
committee name and leaders did not provide a ground for abrogating the
original contract, found the second contract invalid, and ordered the return of
the factory to the plaintiffs. It also directed that the committee compensate
the plaintiffs for damages caused by the committee's freezing of the plaintiffs'
accounts and assets (a total of 160,000 yuan) and ordered the current year's
contract production quota be lowered since the dispute had halted
production. Finally, it ruled that the fee for the suit, 1600 yuan, be paid by
86
the defendant.
2. Administrative Regulations.
Responsibility contract disputes have
occasionally centered on issues that are governed by administrative
regulations. For example, in one case from Zhejiang, a dispute arose over the
ownership of a sum of money paid by a state purchasing department to a
contract household for sales of tea in excess of quota requirements. Both the
contract household and its collective, the owner of the tea plantation that had
been contracted out, claimed rights to the payment, which had been made
under a state regulation providing for higher purchase prices and reduction in
certain state-levied taxes when households exceeded production quotas. The
responsibility contract between the household and the collective did not
address the issue because the regulation had not existed at the time the
contract was entered into.
The court determined that two sets of regulations, one promulgated by the
provincial government and one by the provincial department of finance in
85. See note 59 supra.
86. See Peasant's Daily, February 26, 1986, at 1. See also SHEN, supra note 60, at 114-115, and the
Legal Advice Column in China Legal News, May 9, 1986, advising a peasant that his contract was
protected by law from the attempts of new leaders to terminate it.
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conjunction with the provincial supply and marketing department, were
relevant to the dispute. Guided by these administrative rules, it negotiated a
settlement of the dispute. 8 7 Although the account of this case does not
mention the court's consulting with the provincial government and provincial
departments, courts will typically discuss interpretation and application of
administrative rules with the offices that promulgated them before rendering
decisions.
Other laws that in some way bear on rural responsibility
3. Other Laws.
contracts-the General Principles, the Inheritance Law, and the land laws
described above-were not cited either in case reports collected by the author
or in court interviews. However, since most of the laws had been on the
books for only a year or two at the time of many of the disputes analyzed in
this article-the General Principles were not promulgated until 1986-lack of
reference to the laws is not an indication that they will not serve as the basis
for court decisions in the future. Unless a specific law or regulation on
responsibility contracts is promulgated, the General Principles in particular may
be frequently cited by courts since many of them are fundamental rules of
broad-ranging application. For example, article 3, which establishes that
parties in civil activities, whether legal persons or citizens, enjoy equal status,
will give courts a legal basis for rejecting collective leaders' claims that their
administrative authority over households grants them the power to terminate
or modify contracts unilaterally. Similarly, articles 27 and 28, which establish
that the "contract management household" is a civil legal subject with
independent rights and duties, will supply a statutory basis for the protection
of the rights of contract households. 8 8 But in terms of actual impact on the
courts' resolution of disputes, the GeneralPrinciples' contribution will be slight;
as discussed above, the General Principles primarily reiterates adjudicatory
principles that courts have been applying for several years already.
4. Other Legal Bases: Chinese Contract Law Theory and Supreme Court Guidelines on
The Economic Contract Law did not create an
the Handling of Disputes.
entirely new set of contract law principles with one dramatic legislative stroke.
Many fundamental principles of contract law, such as the binding nature and
legal enforceability of valid contracts, the equal status of parties to a contract,
and the requirement that contracts be modified or terminated only with the
agreement of both parties, already had existed in the Chinese contract law
theory explicated in textbooks and treatises.8 9 One commentator has argued
that in the past, general provisions contained in treatises-along with statutes
where these existed-guided the resolution of legal problems; for this reason,
he argues that the new General Principlesof Civil Law will have little actual effect,
87.

See

SHEN,

88.
(1987).

See

SHEN,

89.

supra note 60, at 26.
ECONOMIC T'RIAL WORK AND THE GENERAL

See, e.g., I PRINCIPLES

PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW

OF CIVIL LAW OF TiE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

26, 32-33

168-69, 184, 188-89

(1980 China People's University Law Department, Civil Law Teaching and Research Group).
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being "for the most part a codification of the general provisions of the
treatises.' ' 0 Whether this view is entirely correct is debatable, but certainly
the continuing influence of such basic principles is attested to by the
occasional responsibility contract dispute decision in which the court enforces
the contract and protects a party's contractual rights without reference to the
Economic Contract Law or any administrative regulations.
For example, in one case involving a responsibility contract for the
management of lotus fields, the collective lent its water pump to another
village despite a contractual obligation to rent it to the contract household.
The peasant subsequently suffered crop damage when heavy rains flooded his
fields and the village failed to supply a pump. When he refused to pay the
contract fee, the village sued him. The court did not cite the Economic
Contract Law in its report of the case. Instead, it simply declared that it was
necessary to protect firmly the "sanctity of contracts" (hetong de yansuxing) and
the "legal rights and interests of contracting parties." It found that the village
had violated the rights of the peasant and ordered the village to assume
responsibility for breach of contract. 91
Greater uniformity in the courts' handling of disputes may come from a
1986 Supreme Court judicial document entitled "Opinion of the Supreme
People's Court on Certain Problems in the Trying of Rural Responsibility
Contract Disputes" ("1986 Opinion"). 92 The 1986 Opinion, which is meant
to guide lower courts in the handling of responsibility contract disputes,
consists of eleven sections on the following issues: (1) court acceptance of the
disputes; (2) determination of void contracts and the disposition of property
in cases of void contracts; (3) assignment and subcontracting of contracts; (4)
modification and termination of contracts; (5) release from, or reduction in,
obligations in the event of natural disaster; (6) unilateral termination of
contracts by the collective owner of the resources; (7) overly high or low
contract quotas; (8) exploitative management by contracting parties; (9)
assumption of debts incurred to third parties during the contracting of
township enterprises; (10) status of partnerships in litigation; and (11) the
enforcement of judgments and settlements.
The 1986 Opinion belongs to the category ofjudicial documents that the
Chinese term "judicial explanations" (sifa jieshi): formal commentary by
China's highest organs ofjudicial work-the Supreme People's Court and the
Supreme People's Procuracy-on specific problems concerning the
application of laws that have arisen during adjudication or procuratorial
work. 9 3 Judicial explanations of the Supreme People's Court do not carry the
90.

See Jones, Some Questions Regarding the Significance of the General Provisions of Civil Law of the

People's Republic of China, 28 HARV. J. INT'L L. 309, 324-25 (1987).
91. Report of Yue Yin District Intermediate People's Court, 5

LEGAL SYSTEM MONTHLY

12

(1985).
See 3 BULLETIN OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT 3 (September 20, 1986).
See WU ET AL., BASIC THEORY OF CHINESE SOCIALIST LAw 261 (1987). According to Wu, the
judicial explanations of the Supreme People's Court are termed "adjudication explanations" and
those of the Supreme People's Procuracy termed "procuratorial explanations." Decisions of law that
92.

93.
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force of law-according to Chinese jurisprudential theory, courts do not make
law-but are considered binding on lower courts unless special circumstances
warrant otherwise. In the future, then, court approaches to responsibility
contract disputes should become more uniform.
Unfortunately, it will not be possible to trace directly the 1986 Opinion's
precise impact on the courts' handling of disputes because courts do not cite
judicial explanations in their decisions even when decisions are based on
them. Judges interviewed stated that the 1986 Opinion would aid in, but not
dramatically alter, their handling of disputes since their current approaches
were essentially consistent with those suggested in the Opinion. Such
statements should not be regarded as simply self-serving; the Opinion is in
fact the product of several judicial work conferences convened by the
Supreme Court to discuss the handling of responsibility disputes, and it is
94
likely that the results of those meetings were officially transmitted to courts.
C.

Positions Taken by Local Governments or Administrative Organs
Toward the Dispute

One important factor in court decisionmaking which is usually not openly
discussed by Chinese sources, and about which foreign students of the
Chinese legal system know relatively little, is the position adopted by
administrative organs or a local government toward a dispute. Because
responsibility contract conflicts generally do not touch upon administrative
regulations, administrative departments are not often approached by courts.
Judicial solicitation of the opinion of an administrative department or local
government is to be expected when there is a question of interpretation of an
administrative rule; in many kinds of commercial disputes, administrative
regulations can be decisive because relevant laws do not exist, contain
lacunae, or are too general. However, the influence of local governments on
judicial decisionmaking in responsibility contract disputes runs much deeper.
Even though no administrative rules are involved, courts as a matter of course
solicit the views of government officials and often place great weight on their
opinions.
A case involving a contract to manage an orange grove in the suburbs of a
large city 9 5 gives some idea of this phenomenon. In this case, a peasant in a
suburban collective organized a small group of friends and relatives that
contracted to manage a grove of orange trees. As head of the group, the
peasant signed with the collective a detailed responsibility contract to manage
the trees for five years. Among other provisions, the contract required the
courts, including the Supreme People's Court, make in specific cases are not to be confused with
judicial explanations; the former do not have any binding force beyond the immediate case and are
not intended to guide future adjudications.
94. The Supreme Court organized at least two work conferences about responsibility contract
disputes in 1985. Two of the main topics at the meetings were the criteria for void contracts and the
administrative aspect of the contracts-the "superior/subordinate relationship" existing between the
collective and the contracting party, who is usually a member of the collective.
95. Details of this case have been altered slightly for reasons of confidentiality.
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peasant to follow certain procedures for the care of the trees. Several months
into the contract, the collective terminated the contract, charging that the
peasant had violated it by selling fruit without permission, secretly retaining
sales revenues instead of sharing them with the collective, and failing to care
properly for the trees. The peasant sued the collective for breach of the
contract.
The court commenced its investigation of the case by seeking out officials
of the township government with jurisdiction over the collective. These
officials informed the court that prior to the termination of the contract,
government cadres from the city had decided that because fragmenting the
large orange groves in the city's outlying counties and townships and
contracting out parcels to individuals had resulted in poor management, the
practice was to be halted. Instead, large groves were to be managed by
special groups organized and coordinated by collectives. Furthermore,
according to the officials, one of the city government cadres in charge of
agricultural production had stated that large groves that had already been
split up and contracted out to individual households should be reclaimed and
contracted out anew to groups. In the opinion of the township officials, the
collective's termination of the contract accorded with these decisions; the land
involved in the dispute was part of a larger tract and the collective was not
satisfied with its management. They had accordingly approved the collective's
decision to seek to end the contract, 9 6 and they continued to support that
action. In response to the court's request to see written documentation of the
city government policies, the township government cadres provided a
document, issued by the "Fruit Products Production Leadership Group" of
the city government; the document summarized comments made by city
government officials at a recent meeting on proper management of suburban
orange groves.
For the court, which on the basis of other evidence was already leaning
towards the collective's position, the opinion of the township government
officials and the city government document proved decisive. It adopted the
position that while the collective had not done a proper job in explaining the
situation to the peasant and persuading him early on to terminate the contract
voluntarily, it did have the right to terminate the contract. After making its
position clear to both parties, the court urged the plaintiff to withdraw the suit
and accept a settlement with the collective. Under the proposed settlement,
the contract would be terminated, but the collective, as acknowledgment that
it had not approached the problem of terminating the contract properly and
had not been sensitive to the peasant's concerns, would pay the peasant
compensation for work missed because of the dispute. (All of the other
members of the original contracting group had already accepted work

96. The collective apparently was not aware of the decisions of the city officials at the time it
terminated the contract.
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assignments from the collective after the termination of the contract.) 9 7 The
court also informed the plaintiff that if he did not withdraw the suit, it would
rule against him. The parties agreed to settle.
D.

The Principle of Fairness: Fairness in Contractual Dealings and
Protection of Parties from Unforeseeable Economic Hardship

Courts also are guided in their decisionmaking by a basic principle of
fairness. No concept of party autonomy in contract formation, at least in the
case of rural responsibility contracts, appears to restrain courts from
achieving a just result by rewriting or terminating contracts. A prominent
example is the courts' treatment of penalty (weiyuejin) clauses in contracts.
When they exist, 9 8 penalty clauses in contracts are usually directed against the

contract household and may sometimes be onerous; one court reported
seeing fish pond contracts calling for 50,000 to 60,000 yuan penalties where
the total sum due under the contracts was a fraction of these amounts. 99
Courts have refused to enforce penalty clauses they find "unreasonable,"
even where the contracting party has clearly breached the agreement.
Determination of what constitutes "unreasonable" is apparently decided
by individual courts; courts stated they used their own judgment and made
case-by-case determinations. The Zhengding County Court recounted two
instances where it did not enforce penalty clauses; in one case, the penalty was
100 percent of the yearly contracting fee (2000 yuan) for late payment, and, in
the other, a contract with a fee of 5000 yuan annual fee, the penalty was 1000
yuan for each day that payment of the contracting fee was overdue. 0 0 The
Yixing County Court stated that though it had not had disputes over penalty
clauses, it would not enforce "unreasonable" penalties; in its opinion, the
reasonableness of a penalty clause depended on the ability of the breaching
party to pay compensation as well as the damages that the breach had caused
or was likely to cause.
Courts also protect parties from losses when poor contract drafting
enables one party to exploit loopholes in a contract. In one case handled by
the Zhengding County Court, peasants from one village contracted to manage
for one year the brick kiln of another village. The contract fee was 12,000
yuan. To run the kiln, the contract provided that "[o]ut of one ton of diesel
oil stored in each warehouse, 150 gongjin will be supplied to the contracting
party." When the peasants asked for the supply of oil, the other party refused
97. It is interesting to note that, originally, the judge in the case intended to rule that the
termination of the contract was valid because the peasant had violated the conditions of the contract
but nonetheless ordering the collective to pay the peasant some compensation owing to the
collective's failure to educate the peasant on the necessity for ending the contract. However, after
other judges of the court argued that such a decision was legally unsound, the court abandoned this
approach and worked to arrange a settlement that would uphold the collective's position while
granting the peasant some compensation.
98. Courts report that one of the most common deficiencies in contracts is the complete failure
to provide for the possibility that one party may breach the agreement.
99. Interview with Yixing County Court, November 1I, 1986.
100. Interview with Zhengding County Court, October 22, 1986.
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to provide any, on the grounds that it did not have any oil which was stored in
warehouses. The peasants were able to purchase the necessary oil from
outside sources but then refused to pay the contract fee at the year's end. The
kiln owner sued for its contract fee. The court found that the kiln owner had
deliberately drafted the clause on supplying oil in very specific language to
permit it to avoid the spirit of the agreement; it did have oil, but the oil was
not stored in warehouses. The court's solution was to negotiate a settlement
under which the contract fee was reduced by 4000 yuan, roughly the amount
the contracting party had expended on buying oil elsewhere.10 '
The courts' desire to see justice done, combined with an instrumental view
of responsibility contracts that stresses performance and enforcement of
contracts which further rural reform policies, has meant that they often
discount the importance of legal formalities. Oral agreements for
responsibility contracting have been common in the countryside. Generally,
courts will enforce an oral agreement if both parties acknowledge the
existence of the agreement and there is sufficient evidence proving its
substance.' 0 2 One example is a 1985 Zhengding County case where the
plaintiff, a villager, sued the villagers' committee for breach of a four-year
orchard contract. The plaintiff alleged that the committee owed him money
for produce which he had sold to it and had dispatched other villagers to
occupy the orchards, thereby disrupting his production. According to the
Zhengding County Court's investigation, two years into the contract the
village committee had discovered that the villager was not taking care of the
orchards' trees and had actually chopped down seven trees, acts that it felt
violateilithe terms of the contract. The committee proposed to the villager
that the contract be terminated early with some compensation paid to him,
and the villager orally agreed to do so. Once the oral agreement was reached,
the two sides commenced registration procedures for return of production
equipment to the village; later, the committee also sent men to the orchards
to take over its management. The court's investigation also revealed that the
committee had not fully paid the villager for apples he had delivered under
the contract and that it owed the villager money for vegetables which it had
permitted the villager to plant in the orchard area.
Based on this investigation, the court was convinced that the parties had in
fact reached an oral agreement and that pursuant to the agreement the village
committee had dispatched men to the orchards. It thus ruled that the contract
had been terminated through the mutual oral agreement of both parties. It
added that the use of an oral rather than a written agreement to end the
contract was incorrect; however, since the evidence showed that both sides
had reached an agreement, it would uphold it. The decision concluded by
101. Though the Yixing County Court gave no specific examples, it also stated that it was
prepared to declare a contract invalid if it found one party taking advantage of bad draftsmanship
and if attempts to modify the contract through mediation were of no avail.
102. See SHEN, supra note 60, at 116-117.
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ordering the committee to pay the peasant the compensation it had promised
him as well as the money owed for the apples and vegetables.
Another example is provided by a 1980 Shaanxi case. On appeal, the
intermediate court found a contract valid despite the fact that the brigade's
accountant had not affixed the collective's seal at the time of the contract's
signing. The court reasoned that the contract should be considered valid
because the leader who had signed it had publicly announced its validity and
still recognized it; moreover, performance of the contract had already been
10 3
underway for six months.
Courts also consistently have acted out of a sense of fairness to protect
parties from economic losses or burdens that are the result of unanticipated
changes in state policies or regulations. In such situations, a court attempts to
mediate a modification of the contract that takes into account the new policy
or regulations. If it cannot persuade the parties to reach a new agreement,
then it will terminate the contract.' 0 4 For example, in one case fromJiangsu,
four households that specialized in raising ducks signed a two-year contract
with their commune to raise 7000 ducks, but within a year had lost 27,000
yuan of the collective's money (apparently lent to the households as start-up
capital) which the collective sued to recover. The court found that the
households' losses had been caused by the termination of state subsidies for
feed; at the time the contract was signed, state policy provided for subsidies,
and the households had entered the subsidies into their calculation of the
economics of the contract. Citing a provision in the Economic Contract Law
that provides for termination or modification of contracts when performance
by a party is rendered impossible due to external factors that are beyond the
control of the party, 10 5 the court determined that the loss was to be jointly
assumed, and proceeded to mediate a settlement based on this principle. 10 6
If courts believe that it is fair for unanticipated economic losses to be
shared by contracting parties, they also appear to believe that unanticipated
profits should likewise be shared by parties. Households holding orchard
contracts reaped large profits in the mid-1980's with the decontrol of fruit
prices. At least some courts perceive these profits to be windfall gains which
perhaps should be shared with the collective and other villagers. 10 7 In
addition, courts are mindful of the Party policy stating that the responsibility
system take care of not only individual but also state and collective interests.
Thus, in orchard contract disputes arising out of complaints that it is unfair
103. "Compensation for Damages Should be Awarded When a Change in Cadres Causes
Unilateral Abrogation of a Contract," unpublished summary of a dispute in Changan County,
Shaanxi Province, in 1981.
104. See SHEN, supra note 60, at 103.
105. The court apparently was referring to article 27 of the Economic Contract Law. It should be
noted that article 27 expresses only a general principle, viz., that contracts may be modified or
terminated if one party is prevented from performance by external factors. It gives no specific
guidance as to how contracts should be rewritten or how losses caused by external factors should be
allocated between parties.
106. See SHEN, supra note 60, at 25-26.
107. Interview with Henan Province Higher Court judges; see also SHEN, supra note 60, at 105.
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for a single or a few households to enjoy the lion's share of the income from
collective resources, courts are likely to try to persuade the contract
household to accept a modification of its contract which would give the
08
collective a larger contract fee or percentage of the sales income.'
E.

Summary: A Case Study

The interaction of law, policy, and the court's sense of fairness can best be
grasped by following from start to finish the handling of individual
responsibility contract disputes. This article will therefore conclude with a
closer look at one case.
The facts of this fascinating case, at least as stated in the report of the
intermediate level court upon which this summary is based, 0 9 are relatively
simple. In early 1982, a production team which owned a machinery parts
factory contracted it out to three individuals, one of whom, Zhang, was the
team's leader. The three-year contract stated that the team would give no
more than 2000 yuan to the contracting parties for equipment, that working
capital would be supplied by the contracting parties, that each year the
contracting parties would pay 1000 yuan to the team, and that after meeting
the 1000 yuan payment the contracting parties would take a share of the
profits.
In May 1982, Zhang called a meeting of the team's members. According
to most witnesses at the meeting, he announced that the contract had been
annulled and that the factory would be returned to the team for management.
However, no written agreement stating that the contract had been annulled
was produced at the meeting, and no notes of the meeting survived.
Moreover, the original contract had not been torn up. After the meeting, the
team assigned nine persons to work in the factory. Several months later, one
of the three contracting individuals died and the second person withdrew
from the contract, leaving Zhang as the only contracting party. Zhang
appointed his older brother, an outsider from another village, to take charge
of the factory. At that point, a dispute over control of the factory and division
of its profits and assets erupted; the team sued Zhang, claiming that the
contract had been terminated by the May meeting.
In July, the lower level court ruled that the contract was void because
appointment of a non-team member to manage the factory violated its
statement of purposes and thus exceeded the operating scope of its license. It
108. Henan Province Higher Court judges stated that they believed modification of contracts in
these circumstances to be justified and fair but added that they would not force a household to agree
to modification. Courts' readiness to modify contracts is attributable to political pressure as well as
their own feelings of equity. Officials have expressed publicly the opinion that some patently
"unreasonable" contracts should be "supplemented and perfected" to give the collective a larger cut
of profits. See, e.g, Peasant's Daily, July 16, 1986, at 2.
109. In the interests of confidentiality, the location of the case has not been given and the type of
factory, altered. The case description is based on the court's unpublished report of the case to the
local Party committee. However, the author did not have access to other materials or to the judges in
the case. One suspects that the dispute was sparked or complicated by factors that the court's report
does not mention.
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also ruled that the contract had lost legal effect after the May meeting. The
court ruled that the factory's profits, fixed assets, original materials, and
presently warehoused materials all belonged to the team. However, 10,000
yuan was to be taken out of the factory's profits to compensate Zhang. It also
ordered Zhang to pay 70 percent, and the team 30 percent, of the litigation
fee. Zhang appealed.
In December, after its efforts to reach a settlement collapsed, the
intermediate court (the author of the report) convened a meeting of its trial
committee (shenpan weiyuanhui). The committee was unable to reach a
consensus. Some members felt the meeting had effectively rescinded the
contract; others did not. The court then asked the provincial higher court for
instructions.' 0 In December 1983, the court finally ruled that the contract
had been terminated for two reasons: First, despite the fact that procedures
for terminating the contract had not been completed, eleven out of the fifteen
households in the team had acknowledged the contract's termination, and one
of the original contracting individuals (the one who had withdrawn from the
contract) had testified to that effect; and second, the original contracting
subject, a group of three individuals, no longer existed. However, it found
that the basic level court's decision that the contract was void was
inappropriate. The intermediate court preserved most of the lower court's
decision but modified it to make it slightly more favorable to Zhang, who was
awarded the factory's original materials and the warehouse stock. The court
also ordered each of the parties to pay 50 percent of the litigation fee.
The case did not end there, however. In April 1984, the local newspaper
published a letter from Zhang complaining of his treatment. The letter was
accompanied by a supportive investigative report. This publicity, together
with letters from Zhang's lawyers to Party leaders at the Central Party
Secretariat, the provincial committee, and the district committee, prompted
the intermediate court formally to re-examine (fucha) its decision. The reexamination included discussions'"' with the district and township Party
110. One of the issues raised by this case, and one about which foreign scholars have only
impressionistic information, is the nature of the relationship between lower and higher courts. The
court report uses the term qmgshi, which is usually translated as "ask for instructions." The higher
court's response is considered binding on the lower court. Unfortunately, because the court's report
does not detail the higher court's answer, it is impossible to ascertain how it shaped the court's
eventual decision.
111. Again, we can only speculate on the type of interaction between the court and the
organizations with which it discussed the case. The report only describes the organizations' analyses
of the case and provides few clues on the weight of those opinions. One heading of the report is
entitled "Attitudes (taidu) of the District and Township Party Committees Toward the Case."
Another heading is "Opinions of the Province Higher Court and the Rural Policy Research Section
of the Provincial Committee." The report quotes the statement of the vice-president of the Province
Higher Court to the head of the economic division that "[aIll of our opinions are to be discussed with
them [the judges from the intermediate court]. But we cannot impose a consensus." The report also
quotes the head of the economic division as saying to the intermediate judges that "It his is the
opinion of the Province Economic Court. After returning, you (should) ask the trial committee to do
research and report to the district committee for a decision." Although this implies that the district
committee had the final say, it may be that the committee rarely changes a court's recommendation.
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committees, the Province Higher Court, and the Rural Policy Research
Section of the provincial committee.
The opinions offered by these groups are only summarized in the court's
report. But even this partial glimpse provides an idea of the factors which
influenced the court's final opinion. The opinions of the various groups show
that debate focused on: 1) how policy should be applied to the case; and 2)
the legal effect of the meeting. Opinions were divided on how policy
influenced the case. Some felt that Zhang had to be supported and the
decision changed on the basis of the 1984 Number 1 Document, which by
firmly endorsing the contracting out of collective factories, even where the
manager hired workers, I 12 was taken implicitly to mean that individuals who
contracted to manage a factory should generally be supported. Others
disagreed, stating that new policies should not be applied to a case already
decided. Those who supported the decision also believed that the courts'
awarding of 10,000 yuan to Zhang as compensation for his efforts met the
spirit of the 1983 Number 1 Document.' '3 The Rural Research Policy Section
cited both the 1983 and 1984 Documents as support for Zhang's hiring of his
brother to manage the factory and suggested that his brother could not be
regarded as a contracting party. Analyses on whether the meeting had
terminated the contract or not were also split; many seemed to lean towards
the view that though Zhang stated at the meeting that the contract had been
ended, in fact, he and the team had not gone through the necessary legal
procedures.
The court's own final opinion on how to resolve the case combines law,
policy, and pragmatic considerations. It re-affirmed its previous conclusion
that the contract was a valid one. But it changed its position regarding the
meeting's legal effect on the contract; it now concluded that the meeting had
been inconclusive and should not be regarded as terminating the contract.
Noting that the factory had already resumed production under the
management of the team, the court felt, however, that the proper method of
handling the dispute was to have the contract terminated and to reward Zhang
on a preferential basis as suggested in the 1984 Number 1 Document.
112. The 1984 Document gave strong approval to the contracting out of commune and brigade
enterprises by stating that even where contracting parties (managers) hired workers, such operations
should be considered part of the cooperative rather than private economy as long as management
was carried out in accordance with certain principles. Those principles were: 1) ownership rights
were to belong to the commune or brigade, sufficient funds reserved to cover the depreciation of
fixed capital, and a certain proportion of funds set aside for the public accumulation fund; 2) a
certain proportion of profit was to be turned over to the commune or brigade in accordance with
regulations; 3) managers were to exercise full powers of management over the enterprise's business
affairs, but only within the scope authorized by the commune or brigade; and 4) dividends were to be
distributed to individual investors according to fixed proportions, and managers to be compensated
"preferentially," as long as there was no excessively large disparity between their earnings and
workers' incomes. Section 3, subsection 3, 1984 Number I Document.
113. The 1983 Document stated that collectives could experiment with contracting out of their
lactories and that managers should be compensated preferentially. See supra note 107. But its tone
was more cautious than that of the 1984 Document. Furthermore, the 1983 Document emphasized
dlai the responsibility system had to take into account the interests of state, collective. and
individuals. See supra note 67.
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In the end, the court did not need to render a judgment; it was able to
persuade the parties to accept a settlement that reflected the court's views.
Zhang agreed to terminate the contract early while the team agreed to return
the money in the factory's account that had been frozen at the start of the
litigation., Money owed the team for back taxes, workers' wages, etc., was first
to be deducted from the account. Fifty percent of the factory's net profit was
to go the team, 30 percent to Zhang, and 20 percent to other investors in the
factory. 14 Finally, 70 percent of the litigation fee would be paid by the team
15
and 30 percent by Zhang.'
IV
CONCLUSION

A number of different norms and sources of authority have guided
Chinese judges in the adjudication of rural responsibility contract disputes.
While these decisional guides have included laws and administrative
regulations, many cases have actually been decided on the basis of other
factors, most notably Party policy, the opinion of the local government, and a
court's individual sense of justice and fairness in contractual dealings.
The judiciary's handling of rural responsibility contract disputes
demonstrates how policy can deeply influence court decisionmaking. Even
assuming diminished Party involvement in judicial work, the unchallenged
political leadership of the Party ensures that Party policy will continue to be
an important consideration in court deliberations. Though distinct in theory,
the lines between law and policy blur when courts apply policy guidelines,
sometimes in conjunction with legal rules, sometimes independently, to
resolve disputes. The equation of policy to legal rules which courts have a
duty to enforce is revealed by the courts' occasional reference to policies of
the Party and the government as "policy regulations" (zhengce guiding).
The dominant role of Party policy in agricultural responsibility contract
disputes can be attributed to the confluence of two factors-the absence of
governing laws and regulations and the Party's close, sustained involvement
114. The settlement does not mention the 10,000 yuan that was to be paid to Zhang under the
first two decisions. Although it is not clear, it appears that Zhang was not paid this sum because the
settlement yielded him more than.10,000 yuan.
115. The Zhang factory dispute indicates how it may be almost impossible for outside observers
to determine from the case opinion or mediation settlement alone the actual complexity of a case; the
mediation settlement negotiated by the parties makes no reference to the policy or legal issues that
made the case such a thorny one to decide. It is unlikely that a court decision would have mentioned
these issues either. Indeed, we can assume that although most of the case's key issues have been
revealed to us by the intermediate's court report to the county committee, there are also some that
have not. One aspect that we do not really see through the court's report is the personal conflicts
that must have colored the case and may have been at the root of the dispute. From the

circumstances of the case that we know through the court report, it seems likely that the dispute was
caused by the envy of at least some of the team leaders for Zhang's success with the factory. The
report does not provide us with any clues as to the nature of the relations between the judges of the
two courts that ruled on the case and the parties.

However, according to Chinese lawyers with

litigation experience, personal relations between a judge and a party may influence, to varying
degrees, the court's eventual disposition of a case.
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in the responsibility system reform. The role of policy in economic disputes
should thus diminish whenever two conditions exist: First, there are laws or
regulations governing the issues in controversy, and second, there are no
specific Party policies concerning those issues. When both of these conditions
are met, courts can be expected to decide disputes primarily by applying the
controlling legal rules, perhaps after consulting administrative departments.
But another possibility exists. It may be that there are governing laws or
regulations as well as relevant Party policies. If this is the case, what happens
when the laws and policies conflict? In years past, particularly during the
Cultural Revolution, when "bourgeois law" and formal legal institutions came
under heavy attack, there was no question that law was subordinate to policy.
Since 1978, however, rejecting such assertions of the supremacy of politics
over law, some Chinese legal scholars have argued that law should take
precedence over policy when the two conflict.' 16 The courts' handling of
responsibiliy contract disputes suggests, however, that outside of the
academic text, law currently remains subordinate to policy: When Party
policy called for adjustment of contracts, courts have been willing to
terminate valid contracts to effectuate policy.
Court adjudication of responsibility contract disputes has not been only a
matter of law and policy. Judicial decisionmaking also has been based on the
opinions of local government officials. Deference to local government
bureaucrats-who, especially in rural areas, often wear a second hat as local
Party leaders-is a reflection of the political realities of Chinese society. In
comparison to the dominant institution of the Party and the powerful Chinese
state bureaucracy, the judiciary wields little or no power. Even as court
officials decry "administrative interference" in valid responsibility contracts,
they acknowledge the ability of government officials to hinder unjustifiably or
to block totally performance of contracts. Thus, courts, particularly lower
level ones, frequently defer to the views of government officials or attempt to
fashion solutions to disputes endorsed by local officials; without such support,
enforcement of judgments, especially against collectives, can be extremely
difficult. Consultation of government bureaucrats, at least in responsibility
contract cases, appears to be commonplace; consultation is certainly not
limited to instances in which a court requires interpretation or clarification of
an administrative regulation or Central Committee policy.
Judicial deference to local governments may not be purely a characteristic
of rural responsibility contract adjudication, but may be part of a more
general phenomenon of judicial deference to state organs which have
administrative jurisdiction over the disputants, the subject matter of the
contract, or the specific issue in controversy. Courts trying disputes involving
urban enterprises will often discuss the dispute with the administrative agency
or agencies with supervisory authority over the enterprises. In cases where
there do not appear to be any laws or regulations applicable to the issues in
116.

See, for example, the response to a question about why cadres were also targeted by the

effort to popularize basic legal knowledge. China Iegal System News, August 12, 1986, at 3.
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dispute, courts may even refuse to decide a dispute until an administrative
office has declared its position toward the matter. In one dispute observed by
the author in Beijing, a court initially accepted a dispute that erupted between
two units when one worker from the first unit who had been temporarily
loaned to the second unit under a contract was killed, and others injured, in
an accident while working for the second unit. Both parties denied
responsibility for the accident and sought to have the other pay compensation
to the victim's family and to assume medical, disability, and other expenses
for the injured individuals. Faced with a dispute that did not appear to be
covered by any contract or labor regulations, the court informed the parties
that it would not take any action until the local labor bureau reached a
decision on the proper handling of the matter. Since the labor bureau refused
to get involved in the dispute-on the grounds that the contract between the
units was not a labor contract or governed by regulations on workmen's
compensation-the court has repeatedly put off rendering a decision.
Though not articulated as such by courts, the basic principle of fairness in
contractual relations clearly forms an important basis for court
decisionmaking. In responsibility contract disputes, the courts' sense of
equity has led to the rewriting of contracts when it appears one party has
knowingly taken advantage of the other, when parties' inexperience in
contract drafting results in patently inequitable arrangements, and when
parties suffer economic losses due to unforeseeable market changes. That
same sense of fairness appears to underlie court willingness to push for
modifications of contracts when one party profits from windfall gains. To
some extent, court willingness to adjust contract terms in responsibility
contract disputes may be based on the relative commercial naivete of both
peasants and the leaders of their collectives as well as both groups'
inexperience with the use and drafting of contracts. Future studies ofjudicial
handling of contract disputes involving more commercially and legally
sophisticated enterprises and individuals should provide a useful comparison.

V
ADDENDUM

Much of the research for this article was completed by the end of 1986.
Since that time, the number of rural responsibility contract disputes in
Chinese courts has declined, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of
total economic contract disputes. Two facts account for the drop in the
number of cases: First, courts have increasingly referred the disputes to
relevant administrative departments; and second, there appear to be fewer
conflicts between households and collective cadres over the contracts.
Voluntary readjustment of contracts by households and collectives to better
reflect the production and income potential of contracted-out resources,
negotiation of new contracts which avoid the mistakes of the earliest contracts
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(such as vagueness and overly low contract fees), and, in some areas, more
even distribution of production income owing to the return of high income
production resources such as apple orchards to collective management have
all helped to reduce the number of conflicts.
With the shake-out period of rural responsibility contracts apparently over
and disputes less frequent, information on judicial resolution of disputes has
become more scarce. There is no cause to believe, however, that the courts'
methods of deciding disputes they have accepted have changed significantly.
Legal rules remain only one of several decisional bases, and the legal
framework governing the contracts remains skeletal: As of 1989, regulations
governing the contracts were still mired in the drafting stage. Worth special
attention, though, is how courts are deciding disputes that are appearing as a
result of an agricultural policy, introduced several years ago but not yet
widespread, of "appropriate-scale management" (shidu guimo jingying)-recentralization of land management in an attempt to increase production
efficiency. Specifically, appropriate-scale management calls for the reconcentration of scattered, small plots of land that had previously been
contracted out to individual households into much larger parcels; these large
parcels are entrusted to either the collective, a group of households that
operate as a collective unit, or one household with proven success in grain
production, for management. Although official and academic discussions of
appropriate-scale management stress that previously contracted-out land
should not be reclaimed from peasants against their will, rural cadres in some
areas have unilaterally annulled responsibility contracts and reassigned land
over peasants' objections, triggering disputes.' '7 As of 1989, reconcentration '.nd re-contracting of land was proceeding unevenly in different
parts of the country and was being most aggressively pursued in developed,
prosperous areas. But due to peasant reluctance to give up land, weak rural
organization in some areas, and the lack of strong incentives for asserting
collective control (such as highly profitable production resources or the
availability of farm machinery), re-collectivization had not affected much of
the countryside.
The events of spring 1989 are unlikely to directly influence the courts'
handling of rural responsibility contract disputes. The killing of hundreds of
innocent citizens in the name of suppressing a "counter-revolutionary
rebellion" amounts neither to a one-blow dismantling of the Chinese legal
system nor a repudiation of the importance of legal institutions and rules. But
it is a tragic and chilling reminder to people in and outside of China that the
Party's will and word still reign supreme. Furthermore, in a reversal of the
trend prior to June 4, a now highly insecure Party has decided to assert anew
the leadership role of the Party in judicial matters.' ' 8 Thus, if Party leaders in
117. See, e.g., the reports of disputes in Shunyi County outside of Beijing in People's Daily,June 3,
1988, at 2; June 18, at 2; and Oct. 26, at 2.
118. Ren Jianxin, President of the Supreme People's Court, declared at a conference on judicial
work in January 1990 that "various levels of the people's courts must accept, of their own accord,
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charge of agricultural policy determine that some degree of re-collectivization
is the route for hundreds of millions of peasants in the 1990's (and as of early
1990, this does appear to be their conclusion), it will be an exceptional judge
indeed who does not uphold a unilateral termination or modification of
existing rural responsibility contracts made in the name of that policy.

Party leadership" and that "it is a mistake to think that because there is the law, justice can be
executed without the guidance of the Party."

